ENACTIVISM AS A NEW VERSION OF EXTERNALISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18372/2412-2157.18.7342Abstract
The main topic of this article concerns the question, whether the self-knowledge can be still authoritative from the enactivisticpoint of view. The problem rests on two assumptions: 1. The definition of self-knowledge claims that a subject has a direct given knowledge about an intentional contents of his attitudes. 2. The content of subject’s attitudes is determined by external factors, which could be unknown to the subject. It means that the subject has the limited access to the content or its determinantsunderstood as satisfaction conditions of his mental states. On this basis of the obvious conflict between the two theses the firstperson-authority can be questioned.References
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