Stereotype in referential theory of hilary putnem

Authors

  • С. ЛЮБИМОВА Національний авіаційний університет

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18372/2520-6818.32.9582

Keywords:

stereotype, reference, paradigmatic model, verbal representation

Abstract

A widely spread today notion «stereotype», coined in 1922 byW. Lippman, nowadays acquired an extensive terminological meaningdetermined by a branch of study. One of the first scientists who applied thenotion «stereotype» in linguistic studies in 1970s was American philosopherHilary Putnam.Putnam begins by distinguishing a group of general names(like water, lemon, tiger) which are associated with natural kinds. Natural kindsare classes of things regarded as of explanatory importance and whose normaldistinguishing characteristics explained by some deep-lying mechanisms oressential nature.Putnam suggests three conditions for knowing the meaning of a naturalkind or term: implicit knowledge of certain semantic and syntactic markersassociated with the term; association of the word with a certain stereotype; theword reference to a certain natural kind with a certain essential nature.A stereotype for Putnam is an idealized mental representation of a normalcase, which may not be accurate. This stereotype is very similar to what thattraditional view called the meaning of the term. It is a list of properties that areassociated with the term. These properties are not necessary nor sufficientconditions for being a member of the natural kind referred to by the term. It isnot necessary that all or even most of the members of the natural kind possessthese properties. They are properties associated with the term and the naturalkind. Putnam allows natural kind terms to refer to their extension, even thoughthe stereotype may be incorrect.The description of a stereotype lies in the account of the most noticeablefeatures, which constitute a set of paradigmatic properties. Initial nomination ofa natural kind sets to paradigmatic representatives of the kind. Further on theterm of a natural kind is applied to any representative that possesses commonwith members of the kind properties. Affiliation with a kind is determined incompliance with a paradigmatic model. A causal chain between the use of theterm and the introducing event determines the reference of a natural kind term.An introducing event is one in which a term is introduced to the speakerthrough an approximately correct definite description.Putnam defined reference as a social phenomenon, as a form ofcooperative activity, not determined by conditions or objects in individual brains. The central component of a stereotype is a belief, which is the mostgeneralized idea of a natural kind.Putnam’s concept of a stereotype was criticized for its restriction topropositional models. Though many issues remained cloudy, the majorscientific breakthrough of Putnam was the first step in linguistic appliance ofthe term «stereotype» which is represented verbally. Acknowledged function ofthe word to represent stereotype allows to research various stereotypes

References

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Issue

Section

Language Studies. Translation Studies