Modular exponentation method with protection against power analysis

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18372/2073-4751.80.19774

Keywords:

power analysis attacks, simple power analysis, differential power analysis, modular exponentiation

Abstract

The article proposes a method of modular exponentiation on terminal microcontrollers, which provides protection against recovery of secret operands by power analysis. The method is based on the separation in time of processing of the exponent code bits and correspondent modular multiplication operations by storing the operands necessary for multiplication in memory. This prevents the comparison of the modular multiplications detected from the power consumption diagram with the values of the secret exponent code bits. A formalized procedure for modular exponentiation is presented, the functionality of which is illustrated by an example. A method for selecting the procedure parameters is developed in view of microcontroller embedded memory limitations.

It has been theoretically and experimentally proved by the proposed method, which provides protection against both simple and differential analysis of the power analysis without affecting the time of calculating the modular exponent.

References

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Published

2025-03-13

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