# ASSESSMENT OF DESIGNED AND OPERATING TECHNICAL PROTECTION OF INFORMATION USING A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE REAL PHYSICAL PROCESS OF HACKING PROTECTION

## Authors

• Boris Zhurilenko automation and energy management Department of the National Aviation University

## Keywords:

technical information security, hacking probability distribution, mathematical model of a real physical process of security cracking, Poisson distribution, probability distribution of possible hacking, real hacking process, hacking direction line

## Abstract

This paper shows the possibility of assessing the designed and operating technical information security (TIS) using a mathematical model of the real physical process of breaking the protection according to the experimentally obtained attempts and the time of these attempts to break. Evaluation of multi-level operating technical information protection is carried out through an equivalent single-level protection, which can be compared with the equivalent projected multi-level protection and determine its effectiveness. To obtain all the parameters of an effective single-level mathematical model of the real process of breaking TIS, at least three real attempts and their time of breaking the protection are required. Usually protection after hacking is not used, but the hacking parameters become known. If we obtain the data of three attempts to hack TIS with the same parameters of the used information protection, then it is possible to calculate all the necessary parameters of the equivalent one-level protection determined by the mathematical model of the real physical process of hacking. Since, in the open press, there are no experimental results of the study of the process of cracking technical protection, the following model was used to determine the parameters of the investigated TIS. We calculated the probability of hacking with known initial hacking parameters and built a one-level protection, from which we determined three attempts and their time of hacking, the direction of the hacking process, the intensity of hacking attempts and other data that can be determined from the real hacking process. With the help of these data, the inverse problem was solved and all unknown parameters of the investigated TIS were obtained, with a sufficiently high accuracy, coinciding with the initial data laid down in the model when designing the protection.