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ALEXANDER GERARD'S CORRECTION OF HUME'S STANDARD OF TASTE

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Abstract. *The article discusses the issue of the standard of aesthetic taste, a criterion by which one could determine the correctness of aesthetic judgments. In the 18th century, the problem of aesthetic values of objects of nature and of works of arts and crafts became the central issue of many theories of Aesthetics and Art criticism. The issue of the standard of taste involves answering a few basic questions: Is it possible to determine the criterion? Where could such a criterion be found, or who should determine it? And what exactly is this criterion? In this article I try to answer these questions by comparing two most comprehensive conceptions of the period presented by David Hume and Alexander Gerard.*

Key words: Alexander Gerard, David Hume, Standard of taste, aesthetics.

The eighteenth century was a period of unusual literary activity for aestheticians. A lot of treatises were published both on the continent and the British Isles. Later they were recognized as fundamental for this discipline. Their value was confirmed by many editions, which can be still found in the libraries today. If we recall the writings of J. Addison, Shaftesbury, F. Hutcheson, D. Hume, E. Burke, A. Gerard or of A. Alison, to mention only the most eminent British authors, we will not be surprised to hear that the century was often referred to as "the century of taste" [1]. No wonder, too, that the eighteenth century, with its interest in epistemological enquiries fostered under the auspices of R. Descartes, F. Bacon and J. Locke, developed theories concerning the conditions of aesthetic judgments. From the very beginning, however, there was no agreement between thinkers as to the nature of *taste* and its relation to other faculties of human mind. Not only philosophers and scholars did take part in the discussions, but also men of letters and journalists, who popularized the philosophical conceptions [2]. In their practical dimension, the discussions were the response to the need for shaping townspeople's tastes.

There were several problems discussed which were connected with the notion of aesthetic taste [3]. First of all, the dispute concerned the autonomy of taste as a faculty independent from other intellectual powers. For those who claimed such independence, and who sometimes – miming the 17th-century French tradition – called beauty a *je ne sais quoi*, the aesthetic perception was a special mood of experiencing nature. Others tried to make the matter simple and reduced taste to other faculties, such as senses, memory and reason, postulating that this kind of experience is possible thanks to their correlation. Another question raised by aestheticians was whether taste was characteristic for human beings only, or, perhaps, shared by other animals. Also cognitive value of the statements concerning beauty (or the lack of such a value) was understood quite differently according to more fundamental, epistemological premises held by various philosophers. One of the most basic problems of aesthetics that was raised by aestheticians of that period was the grounding of the possibility of sharing judgments concerning merits of particular works of art or aesthetic values (such as beauty or sublimity) of natural phenomena. It was a crucial issue, since without such a justification of how and why people should agree, all the judgments would turn out to be mere opinions. That would make discussions no more than inconclusive

quarrels between people defending their individual opinions. It is easy to note that the problems were interrelated. If for example, taste is a kind of emotional response to beauty (as Shaftesbury and David Hume maintained), it is quite difficult to establish an objective standard for aesthetic judgments. On the other hand, if it can be reduced to common human intellectual powers, that would prove that there is nothing mysterious in it, the road to such a standard is open. Another, more specific issue discussed by aestheticians was the role of reason and imagination in forming judgments of taste. Whereas the use of imagination in the aesthetic perception was taken for granted, the possibility of the employment of reason would make rational standard of taste possible. A more practical problem concerned the cultivation of taste. The question was unavoidable in the age, when more and more people could enjoy not only pieces of art (even if found engraved in books), but also more or less beautiful objects of everyday life. But if such a cultivation was possible, and people could correct their previously wrong judgments, the way of making a progress in aesthetic education together with a possibility of a standard of taste were of crucial importance. Again, without a standard all the disputes would be endless and inconclusive. Recognizing the fact that unlike scientific judgments, judgments of taste cannot be proved, aestheticians tried to elaborate a standard which would make judgments of the beautiful objects at least more probable. And the prescriptions for such a standard, which were proposed by eighteenth-century aestheticians, are the subject of my paper.

The aestheticians generally agreed that the taste is a universal human faculty, and that it could be improved. However, they gave different answers as to the ways of becoming more sophisticated audience for art. As we can easily imagine, it was no strictly theoretical problem, since people began visiting their neighbours more and more frequently. They watched décor in their mansions, compared furniture, dinner services, wallpapers, carpeting, and of course, clothes. That sudden increase of interest in all kinds of goods, however, did not emerge out of nowhere; it was accompanied by general increase of wealth, by bigger demand for everyday objects, and also, by first attempts of theoretical descriptions of aesthetic experience. Not later than at the beginning of the eighteenth century, in 1711, *The Spectator*, which was the first popular British journal, began to appear. It differed from the usual advertisements and brochures which offered all kinds of goods for everyday use. The edition reached almost 3 thousand copies. The paper

could be got for free in many pubs and coffee houses of London. One of its founders and its main author, Joseph Addison, published his *Pleasures of Imagination* [4] there. The essay was an attempt to describe aesthetic principles to the readers and guide their imagination and taste, explaining three main categories, namely novelty, greatness and beauty. The first theoretical investigations into the field of Aesthetics together with an increase of the production of material goods, caused in turn an increase of interest in these objects, cleverly fuelled by pedlars and vendors. Thus, each new-rich holder of a silver-plated table service wanted to know whether he had good taste. It was expressed by decorations of his living room, impeccable arrangement of cutlery, and perhaps by a portrait of his ancestor hanging over the fireplace. People wanted to beautify their dwellings, but very often they lacked any source of inspiration or a pattern to be copied. They needed dependable advice and guidance. No wonder then, that such a standard of taste, which could – at least in theory – verify individual judgments, was an urgent problem that drew the attention of the eighteenth-century thinkers.

Many thinkers dealt with the issue of correctness of taste. Shaftesbury (the author of the widely read *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times*, 1711) stressed the importance of an inner harmony of human affections as a condition of proper aesthetic experience. He introduced the notion of aesthetic attitude, which was later called “disinterestedness”; it was an attitude which was characteristic for experiencing works of fine arts and should also be taken – as his followers claimed – while experiencing the beauty of nature. Edmund Burke (a famous political philosopher, well known also as the author of *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*, 1757) attempted to describe aesthetic judgments by reducing them to cognitive functions; he maintained that all people respond to sensory qualities of objects in the same way, since they have an ability to recognize what is natural in the experience, that is natural pleasant sensations. When transformed by imagination they could be a base for a standard of taste.

There was a wide range of answers given to the question “How is the proper taste possible?”. I would like to focus on two theories developed by two Scottish thinkers: David Hume and Alexander Gerard. Although it is the first one, that received relatively much scholarship, I would argue that the reason of this is the philosophical fame of its author, rather than its intricate substantial value. The fact that Gerard disagreed with Hume in several points should be seen as an attempt to surpass the limitations. But Gerard, who was the author of two treatises *An Essay on Taste* [5] and *An Essay on Genius* [6], was overshadowed by Hume, whose fame grew together with the response of his widely read essays, works on morals and epistemology, and – nowadays – his opus magnum, *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Apart from the two essays on aesthetics, among Gerard’s works we can find minor theological writings and a plan of the improvement of education system in Marischal College in Aberdeen [7]. More specifically, I would like to focus

on the following two of their writings: Hume’s *Of the Standard of Taste*[8] and the fourth chapter of Gerard’s *An Essay on Taste* [9].

A starting point of Hume’s discussion of taste is a distinction which he makes between sentiments and judgments. The former are individual and relative, the latter have an objective value, even if their truthfulness is only probable. The problem lies in the fact that in his emotivistic philosophy, in which aesthetics is based on sentiments, Hume endeavours to explain how it is possible to formulate judgments concerning taste. No sooner than it is achieved, we can know how to formulate a valid opinion of the beauty of some objects, the opinion that could be confirmed by other people of the same community, nation or even an era. Since these are sentiments that are the foundation of every aesthetic judgment (for it is the experience of each individual person, not a quality of an object, that amounts to beauty), the question “Is an object X beautiful?” should be expressed as “Am I correct when I experience an object X as beautiful, i.e. when I feel a pleasant sentiment typical for experiencing other beautiful objects?” So, unlike cognitive judgments, the aesthetic judgments cannot be true or false, but rather correct or incorrect. Such a starting point automatically locates the author of *A Treatise of Human Nature* on the subjectivist position, though – as Hume tries to prove – not an individualistic one. Hume is well aware of the fact that granting an absolute individualism of taste would stop all discussions concerning aesthetic values.

Even if we observe the popularity of a cliché *de gustibus non est disputandum*, there is another one, quite the contrary but also commonsensical. It says that not every piece of art is equal with the rest as it is quite evident that some of them are complete rubbish, while other are masterpieces. The problem arises, however, if we are to evaluate not the extremities – as da Vinci’s painting and a child’s scribble – but pieces of an average, similar artistic value. This is precisely where one, not being sure of his own views, needs a standard of taste.

Hume points out several conditions that have to be fulfilled if we want to be assured of our ability of judging. The first and the most obvious is properly functioning senses. Others include: rich experience based on many examples supplying the imagination with material, and the subtlety of fancy, that is an ability of distinguishing between various feelings and emotions caused by objects. It is also our imagination which traces connections between ideas caused by a work of art – the rules of composition, mutual relations of its parts, the strength and clarity of style, the naturalness of descriptions of passions, etc. Eventually, if we are endowed with sensitive imagination enabling us to feel the subtle differences of our passions caused by minute differences of works of art, and if we are unprejudiced (another condition mentioned by Hume), we can expect that the sentiment we feel when we are exposed to a piece of art is “justified”. This, in turn, allows us to expect that others will share our opinion. It will be right for us to say that it is not only our opinion, but also a judgment.

The above-mentioned subtlety or, as Hume writes, “delicacy” of imagination, is closely connected with the

problem of the standard of taste. Whereas the response to a quality of a piece of art concerns human sentiments, a justified judgment of taste is – as D. Hume writes – a “questions of fact, not of sentiment” – even if the fact is only probable. “Whether any particular person be endowed with good sense and a delicate imagination – D. Hume continues – free from prejudice, may often be the subject of dispute, and be liable to great discussion and enquiry: But that such a character is valuable and estimable will be agreed by all mankind [2, 229].” Accordingly, we could differentiate between three kinds of the justifications of taste:

a) *taste as a certain sentiment* – on this level no reason of taste can be given; the only justification is someone’s belief in the accuracy of their opinion;

b) *the verdict of a person endowed with certain qualities* (such as wide experience, delicate imagination and the lack of prejudices) the possessing of which justifies the opinion and enables a person to expect that they have a right to expect that the opinion is not only individual, but it can – or even should – be shared by others;

c) in case of little differences among people another justification is necessary, for only huge differences of the delicacy of their imagination or of their experience can be easily recognized; the sign of the proper disposition to judge of an aesthetic quality is the *extent of agreement among people*, eventually perhaps “by all mankind”. In other words: the fact that an opinion is shared by critics is a sign they fulfil necessary conditions of a judicious spectator (that is they are endowed with the qualities mentioned above), which, in turn, can give reasons for someone’s belief that their sentiment (approbation or disapproval) is right.

Even if D. Hume claims the commonsensical character of such a conception – for it would be difficult to undermine the validity of the proposed qualities of a good judge, it is not hard to notice its shortcomings. It is the poor works of art, light reading, such as romances, that are more applauded rather than worthy literature. Moreover, more people would statistically hang a trashy painting in their flats than a sophisticated work by a modern artist.

We must notice, however, that the abovementioned three ways of legitimizing someone’s opinion do not refer to aesthetic qualities as such. Here we should refer to a stratification of judgments, which would make Hume’s theory more acceptable.

1. *A simple, unjustified opinion* – there is no standard of taste for it, and a work of art is simply “liked” with no reference to the opinion of others; to put it simply, if I like a book, a painting, or a song, I like it even if the plot is not sophisticated, the colours – too bright, and melody – very easy to grasp. Perhaps it is a kind of prejudice, such as a memory of my childhood, that makes me like it, but it does not disqualify the pleasure when I read it, look at it or listen to it.

2. Another, higher and more sophisticated opinion is *a sentiment of approval which could be expected to be shared by others* – when a critic’s prejudices are lost and the experience is wider. Again, as an inward feeling it is a sentiment, but reasonable conditions of its correctness can be found and a possibility of “dispute, great discussion and enquiry” can be established.

But since people can agree as to various things, valuable and poor, and several styles come into fashion sometimes, the real quality of which after years turns out to have been exaggerated, Hume adds the third kind of sentiments and the third way of legitimizing a judgment correspondent to it:

3. A sentiment of approval concerning the works of art, the value of which exceeds temporary agreement of critics. These are real works of art, and the sentiment of approbation should be distinguished from the two other sentiments mentioned above. In its subjective aspect, the standard of taste consists in the ability to distinguish this kind of feeling (or having a delicate imagination). In its objective aspect, it is a lasting approval of people in different ages for some works of art.

“Wherever you can fix or ascertain delicacy of taste – says D. Hume – it is sure to be approved of and the best way of fixing it is to appeal to those models and principles, which have been established by the uniform approbation and experience of nations and ages [2, 220].”

However, as the history has not ended yet and its verdicts still can be changed or cancelled, even this kind of judgment, the judgment of history, is only probable. But D. Hume would argue that this kind of probability is all we have. When D. Hume rhetorically asks whether such good, judicious judges ever existed, he adds, that it is not his task to prove their existence. All he wants to do is to indicate the manner in which a private, uncultivated taste of an ordinary man can be corrected and improved. Unfortunately, D. Hume does not provide us with any detailed analyses concerning the way human taste is improved, and ordinary people begin to be good judges and true critics of art. Although it is hard to disagree with his description of social circulation of opinions, and with his call for cultivated taste and impartial verdicts, his conception seems to be little more than a commonsensical description of the way of valuating works of art.

On the contrary, Gerard’s remarks on the standard of taste can be seen as a critique of the shortcomings of Hume’s theory. A. Gerard gives his definition of aesthetic taste in the first paragraph of *An Essay on Taste*, where we read *inter alia*:

„A fine taste is neither wholly the gift of *nature*, nor wholly the effect of *art*. It derives its origin from certain powers natural to the mind; but these powers cannot attain their fully perfection, unless they are assisted by proper culture. Taste consist chiefly in the improvement of those principles which are commonly called *the power of imagination*, and are considered by modern philosophers as *internal* or *reflex senses*, supplying us with finer and more delicate perceptions, than any which can be properly referred to our external organs. These are reducible to the following principles; the senses of novelty, of sublimity, of beauty, of imitation, of harmony, of ridicule, and of virtue [1, 1].”

In this definition we find an echo of the earlier British aesthetic conceptions which were developed by Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson [10]. They tried to explain aesthetic taste by referring to the notion of internal sense. A. Gerard adopts the notion but reformulates its meaning; the inward sense ceases to

be a synonym of aesthetic taste, related to any teleologically organized set of appearances or an innate ability of imagination to experience pleasure arising from the contemplation of beautiful shapes or moral ideas. He uses the term in a much broader, and only partly metaphorical, sense. The meaning of the notion arises from an analogy to external senses, the sensations of which are of immediate and direct character, and from the fact that inner senses do not refer to a particular quality of perceived objects, but to a certain aspect of conceiving them. Thus, A. Gerard is far from cognitive atomism proposed by J. Locke in which each of the senses provides its specific cognitive content, but stresses the activity of imagination operating on already compound results of the operations of external senses.

By binding inward senses with certain aspects of perceiving sensuous phenomena A. Gerard was forced to assume several such dispositions responsible for recognizing different aesthetic aspects of sensuous experience. Enumerated in an unsystematic way, they are not derived from one common notion of aesthetic experience. They are connected with particular values – partly aesthetic, partly moral – which were in the centre of the attention of the eighteenth-century aestheticians and moralists. The internal senses (the sense of beauty, of sublime and the like) are elements of a general taste the sensitivity of which depends on the proper functioning of each of them. Quite contrary to external senses which furnish human imagination with particular impressions, inward senses are not natural faculties operating without any training; though they are ways of perceiving external objects and human deeds, initially they are no more than certain potentialities of human soul. As such they need cultivation.

Thus on the one hand, the good taste depends on natural abilities or predispositions of the mind, such as sensitivity, sensibility of heart [11] or operations of reason. On the other hand, however, one of the conditions of their functioning is the harmony and cooperation of particular inward senses. Gerard's ideal of the well-developed taste is a more or less equal sensitivity of each inward sense, although the most developed one will give a certain tone to the whole human experience. Such a disharmony, when great, corrupts the general taste. It is impossible to appreciate the beauty of a sunset, without simultaneous experiencing of other values, that is sublimity, proportion or harmony. It is also in our perception of beauty that other inward senses are engaged. This in turn requires long and diverse experience.

The involvement of several inward senses in appreciating a natural object or a work of art is not the only condition that is required for a good taste. The natural abilities are not less important. It is their description – the activity of imagination, associations among ideas, raising passions and sentiments – which is the part of Gerard's conception that makes it interesting. Not only does he introduce the claim of the necessity of the disinterested, impartial attitude toward an object but he also gives a more detailed depiction of a complex interdependencies among human character, temperament, feelings, and even passing emotions which give shape of aesthetic experience.

As it has already been mentioned, A. Gerard starts his considerations with a remark on a noticeable diversity of human sensitivity. He finds the explanation of it in the natural individual characteristics and different degrees of refinement of particular tastes. Also cultural and geographical differences among people are responsible for the variety of human opinions. Thus, the differences of sensual sensitivity play only a secondary role in diversification of tastes among people. Together with the quickness of thought, delicacy of imagination and sensibility of heart, differences occasioned by geographical and cultural determinants form a complex background of aesthetic experience responsible for individual opinions, which are quite often different from one another.

Nevertheless, A. Gerard is convinced that it is possible to find a criterion for correcting aesthetic judgments. As we have seen, it was the very same problem that Hume faced in his essay. In general, the way A. Gerard tries to solve it was similar to that of Hume's. A. Gerard observes that we should abandon all hopes for reducing such an individuality – human sentiments will never be standardized. What we can hope for, instead, is outlining the reasons of recognizing the rightness of someone's feelings when they are made public and become a basis for a judgment. A. Gerard provides two criteria for its objectivity: one concerning its correctness and the other enabling us to check the superiority of one judgment over others.

Here the ways of A. Gerard and of D. Hume start to diverge, and A. Gerard seems to be completely justified in his claims. In his depiction of the propagation of opinions Hume refers to the notion of natural sympathy which makes us feel what others would feel while contemplating a work of art – and even what would an abstract "ideal observer" feel – abandoning his or her own inclinations and prejudices. A. Gerard claims it is no more than a mere wishful thinking. Even if our sentiments can change, and even if we can influence them, there is no reason to expect such an ideal critic will ever be born. Once again A. Gerard stresses that everybody has different feelings and there is no way to reconcile them. By blurring Hume's opposition between always correct (but individual) feelings and more or less correct (but objective) judgments A. Gerard claims there is no need to harmonize human sentiments to construct a standard of taste. If people happen to share the same sentiments, it is rather accidental, and such an agreement is the foundation of the standard of taste. Instead, various degrees of sensitivity can be compared which are reflected in the approval of more or less sophisticated works of art. And here a very interesting distinction between sensation and discernment is introduced.

The first kind of taste consists in receptivity. Even if it is not only mere receptivity of sense, but also of certain feelings, and as such it belongs to imagination, neither criterion of taste, nor any ways of its correction can be prescribed. But if taste is not to be blind – that is if we no longer want to receive pleasure when perceiving something, but also want to know *reasons* for our passions – another act should be added to the

experience, that is the act of reflection. Thus we shift our attention from blind receptivity to active reflecting on what we perceive and we try to explain why certain sets of colours, certain compositions or harmonies are pleasant. We move then from the subjective to the objective aspect of the experience and the way to a criterion of taste lies open.

A. Gerard tries to root the correctness of taste in objective qualities of objects of sense. Once we can establish which qualities are objectively pleasant, being moved by them is a sign that our taste functions in a proper way. When our judgments agree with such a specification, they are correct even if they are not supported by our feelings or are even contrary to them. It is possible, at least for A. Gerard, to accept a certain aesthetic quality of an object when we know what feeling should be triggered by a specific stimulus, even if a particular inward sense is not sensitive enough (or not properly cultivated) to feel it. We can understand that a situation is funny, a landscape beautiful, or a certain music harmonies very sophisticated even if at a certain moment we are unable to perceive it. Thus the reflexive taste has rather intellectual character – it deals with objective qualities even in the absence of appropriate feelings.

Not only does such knowledge of human nature deepen the taste, but also it corrects aesthetic judgments by clearing them of all extra-aesthetic elements. And no later than we know what true beauty, sublimity, or harmony is, can we recognize which feelings accompany particular aesthetic values. Even if knowledge is necessary in evaluating objective features of objects, such judgments must be rooted in someone's experience: though the beauty of a poem can be recognized by referring to certain poetic features – its rhythms, rhymes, metaphors and so on – even if actually its beauty is not immediately and “passionately” experienced, a poem which is not delightful for anybody is a contradiction, no matter how properly it is organized and how sophisticated it is. And here is the role of criticism.

A. Gerard is aware of the fact, that human feelings are too fleeting to be considered in a detailed way and classified. Instead these are their causes – the objective artistic or aesthetic qualities – that can be minutely described. Also the partiality of individual perspective can be avoided in this way. Each piece of art could be then classified in terms of its qualities and its ability to awaken feelings – also aesthetic ones. The fleeting and unstable nature of human affectivity makes it possible to describe feelings not immediately, but by a careful description of the circumstances occasioning them. This is a challenging task, which A. Gerard entrusts to art criticism and philosophy. And the knowledge of aesthetic values can be achieved in no other way than by induction which is based on the experience of critics.

For Alexander Gerard, Hume's standard of taste is a kind of a dreamy vision, and its justification is rather insufficient. We can see his theory as a criticism directed towards Hume's theory. It is more its complement than its opposition. Both philosophers take a similar starting point, which is a receptivity of taste. Both also seek for a way which leads to overcoming the individuality of human opinions concerning artistic creativity. But without

an objectivist's approach hardly anything could we tell what beauty or sublimity is nor can we specify various aesthetic values as A. Gerard does.

Notice:

1. See the significant title of George Dickie's book on this subject: *The Century of Taste. The Philosophical Odyssey of Taste in the Eighteenth Century*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

2. In addition to the abovementioned philosophers and aestheticians the problem of broadly understood aesthetics was undertaken by other writers and literati such as Joseph Addison, Edward Young and others.

3. The reader will find the detailed analyses of the eighteenth-century philosophical aesthetics in the following monographs, which have already gained the status of classic works: Walter Hippie, *The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetic Theory*, Carbondale: The Southern Illinois University Press 1957, Samuel Monk, *The Sublime: A Study of Critical Theories in XVIII-Century England*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960, Peter Kivy, *The Seventh Sense. A Study of Francis Hutcheson's Aesthetics And Its Influence in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, New York: Burt Franklin & Co., 1976, or in the more contemporary work of Dickie's referred to above.

4. Cf. *The Spectator*, Edinburgh 1766, vol. 6, pp. 68-118.

5. A. Gerard, *An Essay on Taste to which is now added part fourth, Of the Standard of Taste*, 3rd edition, Edinburgh – London 1780. The first edition was published in 1759.

6. A. Gerard, *An Essay on Genius*, London – Edinburgh 1774.

7. Cf. A. Gerard, *Plan of Education in Marischal College and University of Aberdeen, with Reasons of It*, Aberdeen 1755.

8. D. Hume, *Of the Standard of Taste*, [in:] D. Hume, *Four Dissertations*, London 1757.

9. It is worth noting that Gerard repeatedly referred to Hume's works. On the other hand, Hume sat in the jury of the contest in which Gerard received the prize for the best essay on taste from the Edinburgh Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Sciences, Manufactures, and Agriculture in 1756. In the work he anticipated the considerations concerning the role of art critics Hume included in his essay a year later. This relationship, however, can be seen in the considerations contained in the first three chapters of Gerard's work. Chapter four, which refers to the standard of taste and role of critics in its development, was published as late as in the third edition of *An Essay on Taste* in 1780. We must conclude therefore that Gerard's early comments on art were only slightly modified in the first three chapters in the last edition of the work. Gerard refers to Hume's idea of standard of taste, but he generally held his own philosophical standpoint which Hume's essay helped him no more than clarify. Moreover, he used the term *the standard of taste* before the publication of Hume's work but referred it to the perfection of all qualities of an object and treated on an equal footing with the internal criterion for the correction of aesthetic judgments.

10. See some interesting comments by Peter Kivy, [in:] *The Seventh Sense. A Study of Francis Hutcheson's Aesthetics And Its Influence in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, New York: Burt Franklin & Co., 1976.

11. The delicacy of taste depends largely on the sensitivity of human passions: „It is such a *sensibility of heart*, as fits a man for being easily moved, and for readily catching, as by infection, any passion that a work is fitted to excite. The souls of men are far from being alike susceptible of impressions of this kind. A hard-hearted man can be a spectator of very great distress, without feeling any emotion: A man of a cruel temper has a malignant joy in producing misery. On the other hand, many are composed of so delicate materials, that the smallest uneasiness of their fellow-creatures excites their pity. A similar variety may be observed in respect of the other passions. Persons of the former cast will be little affected by the most moving tragedy; those of the latter turn will be interested by a very indifferent one (...) This diversity in the formation of the heart will produce a considerable diversity, in the sentiments which men receive from works of taste, and in the judgment which they form concerning them [1, 79].

References:

1. Gerard Alexander, An Essay on Taste to which is now added part fourth, Of the Standard of Taste, 3rd edition, Edinburgh – London 1780.

2. Hume David, Of the Standard of Taste, [in:] Hume David, Four Dissertations, London 1757.

К. Вавжонковський

ПРО НОРМУ СМАКУ Д. ЮМА У ПРОЧИТАННІ ОЛЕКСАНДРА ДЖЕРАРДА

Стаття присвячена проблемі норми естетичного смаку, критерію істинності естетичних суджень. У 18 столітті проблема естетичної цінності природних об'єктів і творів мистецтва опинилась у центрі уваги численних теорій естетики, художньої критики. Обговорення норми естетичного смаку передбачає пошук відповіді на декілька основних питань: Чи можливий пошук такої норми? Де і ким може бути знайдена така норма? Якою саме є дана норма? У статті пошук відповідей на ці питання здійснюється шляхом порівняння двох найважливіших естетичних концепцій 18 в., представлених Девідом Юмом і Олександром Джерардом.

Ключові слова: Олександр Джерард, Девід Юм, Про норму смаку, естетика.

К. Вавжонковский

О НОРМЕ ВКУСА Д. ЮМА В ПРОЧТЕНИИ АЛЕКСАНДРА ДЖЕРАРДА

В статье поднимается вопрос о норме эстетического вкуса, о критерии истинности эстетических суждений. В 18 веке проблема эстетической ценности природных объектов и произведений искусства оказалась в центре внимания многочисленных теорий эстетики, художественной критики. Обсуждение нормы эстетического вкуса предполагает поиск ответа на несколько основных вопросов: Является ли поиск такой нормы возможным? Где и кем может быть найдена данная норма? Какой именно выступает данная норма? В статье поиск ответов на эти вопросы осуществляется путем сравнения двух наиболее значимых эстетических концепций 18 в., представленных Дэвидом Юмом и Александром Джерардом.

Ключевые слова: Александр Джерард, Дэвид Юм, О норме вкуса, эстетика.

УДК 168.5

Л.Г. Дротянко

СПЕЦИФІКА МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИХ ЗАСОБІВ НАУКИ В ПРОЦЕСІ ЇЇ ІНФОРМАТИЗАЦІЇ

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Анотація. У статті досліджуються особливості трансформації методології наукового пізнання в процесі застосування інформаційно-комунікаційних технологій. Розкрито роль міждисциплінарних галузей науки у формуванні нових методологічних засобів.

Ключові слова: методологія, наукове пізнання, постнекласична наука, міждисциплінарні науки, інформаційне суспільство, інформаційно-комунікаційні технології.

Вступ

Становлення інформаційного суспільства, яке відбувається з кінця ХХ століття, завдячує перш за все розвитку інформаційно-комунікаційних технологій, а ті, в свою чергу, – науковій революції, пов'язаній із формуванням міждисциплінарних галузей науки, таких як теорія управління, інформатика, синергетика, когнітивні науки тощо. У цьому суспільстві не просто посилюється роль наукового знання, а воно стає, як справедливо зазначав ще Д.Белл, віссю, навколо якої обертаються всі інші сфери суспільного життя. Продовжуючи його думку, Ф.Уебстер писав: «Роль, яку воно (теоретичне знання. – Л. Д.) відіграє, відрізняє наше суспільство від попередніх, і потенціал цього знання виявляється в тому, що воно дає змогу впливати на майбутнє» [1, с. 371]. Вплив, про який ідеться в дослідженні Ф.Уебстера, найбільшою мірою здійснюється саме через використання в усіх соціальних практиках інформаційно-комп'ютерних технологій, які віддають свій потенціал сучасній техніці.

Справедливим в цьому контексті є й роздуми М.Томпсона стосовно сутності сучасної цифрової революції. На його переконання, розвиток обчислювальної техніки є найяскравішим свідченням цієї революції. Але основою науково-дослідної роботи в усіх сферах був, і залишається нині, математичний апарат, який дозволяє обробляти величезні масиви даних у цифровому вигляді. Це забезпечує людині доступ до використання цифрової техніки не тільки

з метою обчислення, а й для аналізу та виявлення глибинних властивостей самої дійсності [2, с. 60-61]. Отже, не менше значення інформаційно-комунікаційні технології відіграють і в розвитку самої науки в процесі пошуку й відкриття нових закономірностей буття світу, і в отриманні доступу до нової наукової інформації все ширшого кола науковців із різних країн, і в процесі наукової комунікації всередині світового наукового співтовариства. Отже, йдеться про суттєві трансформації в способах отримання нового наукового знання, тобто в методології наукового дослідження, оскільки традиційна теорія пізнання, за справедливим зауваженням Л.О.Мікешіної, втратила довіру у вчених через свої консерватизм, безплідність і недієздатність [3, с. 31]. Від себе додамо – і її нездатність трансформуватися в нових культурно-історичних умовах.

Саме цей аспект розвитку науки та методології наукового пізнання на рубежі ХХ і ХХІ століть є предметом даної статті, й звідси постає її **мета** – виявити особливості трансформації методології наукового пізнання в умовах його інформатизації.

Основна частина

За історичною періодизацією науки В.С. Стьопіна, в її розвитку були класичний і некласичний етапи, а нинішній називається постнекласичним. Саме останній і пов'язаний зі становленням інформаційного суспільства. Переходи від одного історичного етапу науки до іншого вимагали перегляду методоло-