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ФІЛОСОФСЬКА СУТНІСТЬ ТА ІСТОРИКО-ФІЛОСОФСЬКИЙ СМИСЛ ТЕЗИ ПРОТАГОРА

Розглянуто питання щодо коректності витлумачення та інтерпретації філософських текстів в історико-філософському просторі.

Ключові слова: Протагор, теза Протагора, сутність, антична філософія, людина.

O. Aleksandrova

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSENCE AND HISTORICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL SENSE OF PROTAGORAS' THESIS

Article focuses on the problem of correctness of interpretation of philosophical texts in the historico-philosophical space.

Key words: Protagoras, Protagoras' thesis, essence, antique philosophy, man.

UDC 1.147

Wawrzonkowski Krzysztof

SOME REMARKS ON IMAGINATION. NOTES ON THE MARGIN OF DE IMAGINATIONE BY GIANFRANCESCO PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA (1469-1533)¹

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Annotation. *The aim of this article is to explain the role of imagination in human life, as it was understood by Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola. First, I analyze the cognitive function of imagination. Then, I discuss its place within the intellectual powers, its misleading character, and its ability of causing emotions. Finally, I try to point at the ways of controlling it by reason and using it by man for their own purposes.*

Keywords: imagination, cognitive function of imagination, moral principles.

My aim in this article is to reconstruct Gianfrancesco Pico's² views on imagination on the basis of his work titled *De Imaginatione*. Pico starts his considerations upon imagination with an analysis of the term based on its Greek and Latin sources. Although his dependency on the ancient philosophy is weaker in the later period of his works, it seems that the former of the two classic traditions is closer to him.³ The fact that *De Imaginatione* is such an eclectic work, compiled largely on the basis of Aristotle and Plato's ideas is all the more surprising.

We can read about the possibilities of using the term of "imagination" in the very first chapter of the work and we can notice an initial outline of the problem of its relation to the senses. Pointing to the main activity of this power of the soul Pico emphasizes the role of imagination as a confidant of the senses which provide it with all impressions. Using the senses as the source of its material, it is confined to the content provided by them. It also remains free enough to be able to operate on them in any way. That, in turn, is possible only due to the fact that it remains able to continue to maintain their representations once the senses cease to provide it with impressions. Impressions, i.e. the proper pictures of imagination come into being in that way. As they have their source in the senses, they can be recalled without their participation.

Due to being placed between the senses and intellect in the cognitive faculties of imagination, this link between the senses and imagination also results in the latter one connecting the sensual and the higher cognitive power. While analyzing those relations, Pico shows several key features of imagination: „It follows sense, by an act of which it is born; *intellection* it

precedes. It coincides with sense in that, like sense, it perceives the particular, corporeal, and present; it is superior to sense in that, with no external stimulus, it yet produces images, not only present, but also past and future, and even such as cannot be brought to light by nature. It accords with sense in that it employs sensible forms as objects; but it surpasses sense in that at will it separates and in turn combines those forms which sense upon ceasing to function has abandoned. This activity can in no way be performed by sense. Imagination conforms with intellect, in being free, unfixed, and devoted to no special object. But it is surpassed by intellect, since it conceives and fashions the sensible and particular only, while intellect, in addition, conceives and fashions the universal and intelligible, and such things as are purified from all contract with matter."⁴

The sensual nature of imagination determines the way in which it shows its objects. Since they are given in the form of images, they always have to be concrete, though they happen to be more or less clear. Also, they are particular, i.e. they show certain things and not general notions built on their basis. Concrete objects of experience can be considered as particular cases which are brought under particular notions.

On the basis of our own experience, taken as a collected perceptual material in this case, we can recall past events, reconstruct the ones we were not even the witnesses of, as well as foresee those which may happen. In contrast to the first case, in the last two we make use of analogy with some known and relatively solid ties connecting the elements of our perceptions of the world. As Pico rightly notices, the abilities of imagination involved here are in no way related to astrology, alchemy, or even magic, which are strongly criticized by him. On the contrary, they are some of the

basic functions of imagination, though Pico himself could not explain them fully, or deliberately abandoned those aspects of its activities as they fall outside the field of his interests. Nowhere, for example, does he mention the role of imagination in artistic work. What's more, he does not refer to some particular issues as we can learn from the contents of the treatise, justifying his decision with the lack of time or frail opportunities of a positive solution to problems. It is clear, however, that artistic work is based on the same ability of imagination which enables recalling past events and anticipating the future ones. Both situations require the use of the already known perceptual material.

We do not use imagination only as a tool for creating, unless we understand the activity also as spinning visions or imagining something which is not perceived by the senses at the particular moment. We use imagination in the same way in both cases. Pico, however, was more interested in the problem of imagining past events and anticipating the future ones. It was mainly because of the possibility of using it as a tool for promoting the proper citizenship conduct of the future generations and improving their life conditions. As it turns in the further part of the article, both aspects will be connected to the issues of faith and proper taming of the recalcitrant imagination.

Pico does not go that far on the first pages of his work, however. The initial chapters help to understand what this mysterious human ability which so powerfully moves the soul is. That is why the author focuses his attention on the place imagination takes among the other cognitive powers of man. Thus, in the initial outline of the way in which imagination works, Pico presents the most basic of its actions, i.e. the ones which take place without current sensory input and on the basis of the previously obtained perceptual material. The process of recalling the past or looking to the future is always a kind of visualizing, which joins some known elements into an idealized whole that is more or less real, depending on our abilities.

Prior to some further analysis, Gianfrancesco Pico highlights once again the importance of placing imagination between the senses and reason or intellect and its ability to start relationships with all these powers. Soul could think, know or understand nothing without the help of fantasy. Thus, at the same time it supports intellect and reason by providing them with images of sense objects to be contemplated by the first one, and examined and considered by the second.

Only after those preliminary remarks can we look closer at the definition, or rather definitions of imagination which are formulated by Pico. The way he takes up the problem of defining imagination reflects the eclectic character of his whole work. That, in turn, raises some concern about the cognitive value of its content.⁵ While taking those attempts, Pico refers to Aristotle and his treatise *On the Soul*. We should not be surprised then, when we read about imagination: "that it is a power of the soul which out of itself produces forms; that it is a force related to all the powers; that it fashions all the likenesses of things, and transmutes the impressions of some powers to other powers; that it is a faculty of assimilating all other things to itself."⁶

The quoted terminology testifies that these are not the classic type of *definiens – definiendum* definitions, but rather functional definitions which refer to the observed activities of imagination and the roles it plays within the cognitive powers. An analysis of the terms will show us what profound impact imagination has both on our lives and the lives of others. Bearing in mind the Aristotelian division of soul to the vegetative, sensual and intelligent, which Pico borrows from him, as it can be expected, we can assume that imagination appears in the sensual and intelligent soul. Animals (or at least some of them) are already equipped with imagination. It is the most perfect power for them. Man will be the most perfect being in this case, as being equipped with both imagination and reason they transgress the world of animals.

The great role which Pico attributes to imagination in the lives of all living creatures refers not only to the cognitive issues *sensu stricto*, but also to the possibility of foreseeing the consequences of one's own actions and obtaining some expected goods.⁷ These potential gains are the driving power for the majority of human and animal efforts because they can be imagined. In the case of man the process is the following: man anticipates benefits of fulfilling some intentions and chooses the means that are appropriate for achieving the aim. The choice of different ways of achieving it seems to be the ability of man which distinguishes them from other animals. While Pico attributes, as once Aristotle did, a large part of animals with imagination, he would rather refuse to admit that they possess the skills of choosing the ways of fulfilling their needs. It should be acknowledged that animals repeat certain behaviours which once resulted beneficial. If they managed to achieve it in different ways however, they will practice the one which was successful most of the times. Failure on the other hand will result in the change of tactics, rather than pondering which of the methods to choose instead in order to make it easier to get some food for example. In this way, despite the fact that imagination is involved in the entire process, it does not present an animal with a choice of variants. While watching them, we can notice that certain sensory stimuli evoke almost fully determined reactions in it. In the case of man, who possesses similar determinants, the mechanism that determines the behaviour does not occur in such a blatant form.

The above examples show that the prediction of consequences of an action and some possible benefits of achieving their intentions as well as the consideration of ways of acquiring the desired goods requires the action of imagination. It makes it possible to trace the order of events which is visualized, and therefore represented in images, and ended with the achieved goal. Of course we will never see all the images in this kind of imagining. We will neither foresee the way they will be ordered, nor notice any other options. What is more, it should be emphasized that the role of imagination in those activities is only the one of imagining the following steps of the proceedings. By presenting us with some specific fantasies, imagination somehow attracts us to them, or induces our fascination with them. We are moved by an opportunity of achieving some good which we cannot anyhow

imagine in one way. We are excited when we know what the object of our desire is in a different one. That what is "tangible" or even just visualized by imagination will always be more vibrant and more attractive to us than something that is distant and not yet imagined.

However, the same power of the soul, which allows us to predict the future and explore the past, can also obscure our perception of the world. In the chapter of *On the numerous Evils Which come from the Imagination*, Pico takes up perhaps the most interesting issues for him. In that section the negative role of imagination is highlighted, especially in terms of responsibility for the mistakes we make when we succumb to it. That is why it gets the name of a deceiver, a swindler, or even a traitor.

The scope in which our imagination beguiles us is therefore quite wide. But what makes it so that we remain under its irresistible influence, and that we find it so easy to succumb to it? Pico does not provide any definite answers to those questions. A hint that we are mistaken because we are following imagination, rather than opposing to or controlling it, does not explain much. The comments on the differences between man and animal seem to be more valuable. Pico believes that although people are inclined to evil by nature, they can avoid it by choosing their inner light as their guide. And since God created man and gave them dignity, which is also connected with the fact that they are not guided solely by the hints of imagination, each succumbing to its influence brings people to the level of animals, the main driving force of which is an instinctive desire to survive. Irrationality, as Pico points out, is a result of the animal nature, which they cannot be blamed for. In the case of man, however, the resignation from the leadership of reason means a voluntary submission to imagination and being doomed to its sovereignty.⁸ But can the problem be solved so easily? Does the resignation of the leadership of reason necessarily mean getting under the power of imagination? And is it certain, that it is us on who it depends whether we let it dominate us?

Common errors which have their source in the defects of imagination do not always result from the fact that we consciously stop using reason as a guide in our lives, but rather that imagination surprises us, when it comes to the fore with its irresistible force. It suppresses the mind in the same time and obscures its "visual field". Pico offers a reader a vision of man who can control imagination, who is guided only by reason, and who uses imagination to achieve their objectives. Given the errors, which imagination could be the source of, it should be considered whether such an ideal life is possible to implement at all.

On the one hand, imagination obscures our relationships with other people by focusing our attention on the wrong character traits or by paying too much of our attention to the flesh. On the other hand, it plays a major role in forming an idea of another person, which will never be complete or finished. However, depending on the importance of new information which we gain, they may be either put to the foreground by stamping a clear mark on the picture of imagination, or perish in the jungle of some similar data with almost no cognitive value. However, a generalized object of

experience is not a fixed one. It is always given to us in many perspectives and times at once. It lives its own life as if, and depending on the instantaneous disposal of our memory, it is richer one time, and the other time poorer. As we create ideas of other people, so we create ideas of goods, personal profiles, ourselves, our mental acts, and rules of the behaviour of individuals and society.

Thus, we constantly create images which are the only clues, besides the light of reason mentioned by Pico, of how to navigate through the (imaginary) world. Is it then possible to tame the imagination and entrust it to the sovereignty of reason? There is no doubt that imagination is treacherous sometimes, as Gianfrancesco said. It beguiles us, fuels our ambition, or hatred, and many other feelings. With such a cognitive structure, man who is equipped with imagination is somehow forced to compare and collate data presented by the senses, and then make them subjects of evaluation and recognition. Since human experience is not a simple sum of sensations, every one of which may induce a feeling of pleasure or pain in us (I limit the problem only to those two simple feelings deliberately), our inner sensations are so different then. Pico is aware of those differences, but he searches their sources not in the limitations and selectivity of our experiences, but, according to the times in which he lived, in the disposition of the body, opinion, and an object of experience itself.⁹

The bodily determinants of the human nature are more important than we may usually think.¹⁰ According to Pico, the fact that we can have different images of even one and the same thing, which is also of importance to our opinions and ability of finding the truth, leads to some misunderstandings and mistakes that would never be made by the higher faculties. What they can operate on does not however depend on them. Reason dresses things with notions, enables distinguishing them for the former ones and classifies them in different groups on the basis of its own criteria. Images which are worked out by it in that way can be shown to the intellect which finds connections between them and states their adequacy. Wrong opinions and misunderstandings do not result from the fact that the higher faculties are mistaken. It happens so because the senses record them wrongly in the act of object perception, or imagination may distort them, having earlier obtained some ready images. Thus, the problem lies in the lower cognitive faculties inaccurately reproducing what is real, what we have no other access to but through those faculties only. No matter how we understand it, that what is real is always given through some media of sensual impressions or images. That is why we should look for the sources of errors in them, as, according to Pico they are of biological and physiological nature.

In that way Pico finally explains, as he states it, the reasons for mistakes of imagination. That means he is to show only some preventive solutions to them. With respect to the problems of imagination Pico at first recommends some simple exercises in which such an object of interest is looked for that will distract us from the lasting inappropriate disposition of imagination once we focus on it. It is inappropriate, as it is a

departure from the state of balance. In the philosopher's opinion, it is possible to return to the state of stability by preventing the present state with the help of some stimuli which evoke opposite impressions. It means that "if the imagination is too mobile and loose, we must seek a single image, or a few on which to dwell, in order to be a tease from that tumult and varying concourse of impressions. Similarly, if anyone is too sad, he should strive to turn to joy; if too joyful, to sadness. If he is sluggish, he should try to grow excited; if more than properly excited, to become calm."¹¹ Such an effort of the intentional setting oneself into a desired mood is used not only for some prosaic reasons, which is a temporary predisposition of mind. According to Pico, it can also help to divert one's attention from some indecent things, which although attractive, lead us astray. So, we can dampen the unwanted thoughts which fire our desires by focusing on something which can quench the temporary state of our excitement. In this way the author of *On the Imagination* combines psychological considerations with the ethical ones. He also reveals the main objective of his work, which is showing the way in which we can find some appropriate rules of conduct through controlling our imagination. This simple act of directing imagination with the use of some sensory images is quite limited and momentary, though. Thus, if we want to achieve the true good and blessed life, which Pico writes about, we are forced to look for some more permanent bases which enable a lasting change in our behaviour. It is all the more necessary because an individual life needs to be considered in a wider perspective, i.e. with regard to one's relationship with some other members of society. Then, the question of a tinge of one's emotional state has to recede into the background. Moral principles which are supposed to guide us should not depend on the mood, but result from something more substantial, which gives the guarantee of permanence and universality of application and provides some clear guidelines. Therefore, the basis of these principles cannot be sought only in the sensory images, but in the field of reason, which, according to Pico, is better suited for this purpose, as, among others, it restrains imagination with its bridle.

When following the process of cognition starting from the sensory presentation of any daily situation and finishing with an interpretation of it and understanding its meaning, we will notice how it happens that the primary sensual data are getting distorted. It is sufficient to look at an argument between two people, in which each party blames the other one. Not only do they perceive the whole situation in a different way, i.e. from the perspective of their own experiences and through their own mentalities or temperaments and the values or life ideals which have been worked out thoroughly by them during their lives, but also the argument itself becomes a stimulus which moves their imagination. Everything suddenly turns to a tremendous feeling of hatred, disgust, and betrayal. Depending on the whims and carnal dispositions of a speaker, imagination suggests different pictures which are more and more whipping up and tossing them from one extreme experience to the other. Reason follows imagination and orders what it

was presented with, as well as what was already supplied to it in a certain form and a certain order without its participation. It did not achieve that material alone. Therefore, it does not know what its relationship to its origins is. Having the concepts of hatred and betrayal at its disposal, it dresses up the data which it was presented with and sends them to a higher power. Only there – in the intellect – it is possible to state the adequacy of the two levels, i.e. the one of sensory data and the one of notions.

By abstracting from what is here and now, from what is specific, we reach into the realm of notions and ideas which are deprived of everything that is accidental and sensual, but that cannot affect us with such powers as a particular, sensual or imagined picture can. This would result in the achievement of the needed distance. On the other hand, the lack of sensory stimulation and movements of imagination would guarantee a certainty of cognition. With regard to the example of the arguing people it should be acknowledged that the one of them who could control their passions, and abstract from the concrete event and the sensory stimuli resulting from it, would be able to gain an appropriate grasp of the situation and would be the first to stop the further strife. They would cool down faster and lose interest in the further argument either by gaining distance to the subject of the dispute, understanding that it is not that important, by reason appointing of a higher aim, or finally by realizing the feelings that push us towards certain acts. By curbing imagination we bring the situation under control. But a question still remains whether such subduing of imagination by reason is possible at all. Pico makes an attempt to give a positive answer to that.

In order to control imagination, man needs, as Pico says, some support, as they cannot manage it on their own. It results from the weakness of human intellect, which, though it is the highest of our cognitive powers, gives in to the instigations of imagination, as it is not as perfect as God's intellect.¹² A help, which could be given to man, comes in the light of faith, and transgresses everything what could be achieved by man alone.

It turns out then that we still remain in the sphere of images (for, is it possible to treat revelations in a different way?) Due to the fact that they come from God together with the light of faith, they can serve as a suitable medium for the higher cognitive powers and perfect them. It is easier for them to control imagination and use it for their own purposes. Taking into account the division of imagination into the animal and human one, which is made by the author of the treatise and introduced only in the last chapter of his work, we realize that it is because of that division precisely that we need to distinguish between the objectives mentioned earlier. Some of them are determined in a view of the finiteness of human life. They always refer to a particular situation which is likely to happen. The other ones exceed the finitude and place man in the religious perspective of trust. Both the animal imagination, which is characteristic to animals as well as human beings who have not yet reached full maturity and the human imagination are influenced by the light of faith. Though they are subject to it in a

different way, both types of imagination identically understand the truths of the Scriptures, through which a change is made in people's minds.

It is easier for a child or a young man to let themselves be carried away with (animal) imagination, when it operates on images with a strong emotional charge, when "it places before them the punishments and fires of Hell, the rewards and delights of Paradise; and all these in a way which is most agreeable to the imaginative power, so that they are easily comprehended and with no difficulty retained."¹³ The effect of that influence on imagination is quite obvious; visions in the Scriptures are to deter one from what is considered bad and guide towards that what is good. And all this happens only due the power of the images themselves and feelings induced by them. No reasoning would be successful to achieve a similar effect. The impact on the human imagination, which is characteristic of mature individuals, is based mainly on the use of images, often the same ones that were used to shape the desired behaviour of children and adolescents. However, they do not have simple associations with something that is pleasant or unpleasant, and consequently, desired or not, but relate to the truths revealed by the light of faith.

The imagination inspired in such way would be supposed to reach the truths, to which the man could not come with the help of the senses. At the same time the light of faith would correct the misconceptions, making every of their falsehood clear and bringing man to the right path of life. In order to follow the path, one would have to listen to the words of the Scriptures and those scholars and holy men, who have taken the trouble to understand it and present it to others. Imagination used in that way, given to the possession of reason and intellect improved by the light of faith would be expected to bring some valuable benefits. How could we understand the change in the transition from the animal imagination to the human one which is richer because of the mentioned support? The answer seems to be simple for Pico, and he looks for its sources in the attitude of a believer. The act of faith gives a great sense of confidence and some kind of security. People who are deprived of that grace may frequently give in to their imagination, as being eternally vibrant and indomitable it accidentally finds some gaps in the protective barrier which is a human idea of the world, and fills one's mind with them, poisoning it and sowing uncertainty therein. The promise of a future and eternal life would enable looking at the frolics of imagination in a different way. A believer would not consider them to be that dangerous, or at least their impact would not be so powerful. Along

with confidence and a feeling of security we are gaining a new benchmark which we can apply to the objects of imagination. It turns out the various situations and circumstances of life that it reveals and shows in different colours and shades are irrelevant. With regard to the eternal life her actions are only a certain game of images, a part of this world, and a mere sensual side of human life. Temporal goods lose their importance, when compared to the promise of eternal life after death. It means that we strive for them less, and imagination does not fuel our lust for gaining them. In addition to that Pico supports the view of improving man by the light of faith by an implicit assumption of the impact of human humours (i.e. bodily and physiological determinants of human nature) on the way their imagination functions. Let us remind that depending on the current predispositions of man, their temperament and disposition, imagination is stimulated to evoke different images. And they can be joyful, boring, cruel, or sad. A man of deep faith, one of whose qualities is inner peace, would be characterized also by the fact that their imagination would be directed rather to some joyful images, and thus bringing in fewer problems. Their life therefore would also seem to be easier, as abounding in the revealed truths and some specific recommendations as to the conduct. That in turn leads to the fact that imagination and higher cognitive powers are left with the contemplation of the Creator and his work.

This is where the reconstruction of the main elements of Pico's concept of imagination ends. The concept, however, does not exhaust the topic which is limited to some particular aspects of the way imagination functions that are chosen by the philosopher. It is also not developed as much as it could have been due to the state of research on both ancient and the contemporary thought available at the time. Pico combines different philosophical views in his philosophy. On the one hand scepticism and a critical analysis of the sources of human cognition are characteristic to him. On the other, he admits that revelation and prophetic cognition can be valuable, superrational sources of knowledge.

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² Gianfrancesco Pico Della Mirandola (1469-1533), an Italian philosopher, a student of his well-known uncle Giovanni Pico, a polyhistorian and humanist, interested in philosophy and theology, a philologist, a mathematician, an astronomer, a naturalist, an orator and a poet. For a detailed biography of Gianfrancesco Pico, see: Richards G. B. *Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola*, Cornell University Library, typewritten, press no. T 1915 R 515.

⁴ A reader will find some detailed data on the development of Pico's relation to the views of Aristotle in: Schmitt Ch. B., *Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469-1533) and His Critique of Aristotle*, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1967.

⁴ Pico della Mirandola Gianfrancesco. *On the Imagination. The Latin Text with an Introduction, an English Translation, and Notes by Harry Caplan*, Cornell Studies in English, XVI (1930), p. 31ff.

⁵ Let us add that such anxiety accompanies us while reading almost all of his work.

⁶ Pico della Mirandola Gianfrancesco. *On the Imagination*, p. 33.

⁷ Cf. Pico della Mirandola Gianfrancesco. *On the Imagination*, p. 39ff.

⁸ Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 45.

⁹ It should be added that according to Pico the differences also result from the discrepancies between things that be done by the bad and good angels, as well as by God himself.

¹⁰ Cf. Pico della Mirandola Gianfrancesco. *On the Imagination*, p. 55.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 61.

¹² In the treatise *On the Imagination* Pico does not explain the way he conceives God. The hopes pinned on God, as well as a belief in the indisputability of the truths included in the Scriptures let us think that he took the latter one for a reliable source, which he understood literally and in the spirit of the times.

¹³ Pico della Mirandola Gianfrancesco. *On the Imagination*, p. 89.

К. Вавжонковський

ДЕЯКІ ЗАУВАЖЕННЯ СТОСОВНО УЯВИ

Стаття присвячена поясненню ролі уяви в житті людини, і як вона розумілась Джованні Піко делла Мірандолою. Спочатку аналізується когнітивна функція уяви, потім обговорюється її місце в розумовій діяльності, її оманливий характер та здатність спричиняти емоційні стани. Зрештою, виділено способи контролю уяви розумом та їх використання людиною у своїх цілях.

Ключові слова: уява, когнітивна функція уяви, моральні принципи.

К. Вавжонковский

НЕКОТОРЫЕ ЗАМЕЧАНИЯ КАСАТЕЛЬНО ВООБРАЖЕНИЯ

Статья посвящена объяснению роли воображения в жизни человека, и как она понималась Джовани Пико делла Мирандолою. Сначала анализируется когнитивная функция воображения, потом обсуждается ее место в умственной деятельности, ее обманчивый характер и способность вызывать эмоциональные состояния. В конечном итоге, выделены способы контроля воображения умом и их использование человеком в своих целях.

Ключевые слова: воображение, когнитивная функция воображения, моральные принципы.

УДК 1.147

Л.Г. Дротянко

СОЦІОКУЛЬТУРНІ ПІДСТАВИ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ ПОНЯТІЙНОГО АПАРАТУ СУЧАСНОГО ФІЛОСОФУВАННЯ

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Анотація. У статті досліджуються соціокультурні фактори, які зумовлюють зміни у понятійно-термінологічному апараті філософії, зокрема ті, що ведуть до трансформації понять, що виникають у сучасному філософуванні.

Ключові слова: філософування, філософські поняття, соціокультурна детермінація, трансформація понятійного апарату.

Вступ

Філософія як духовна квінтесенція епохи, як її назвав Г.Гегель, не лише розвивалась і трансформувалась під впливом трансформаційних процесів у культурі, її цивілізаційних засадах, але й виявляла паростки, тенденції тих культурних феноменів, обриси яких ще не вгадувалися в інших сферах людського духу. Саме ця здатність філософського мислення «провокувала» формування нових понять і термінів, через зміст яких розкривалися характерні ознаки нових явищ у різних галузях культури. Зазначене вказує на амбівалентний характер процесу формування нового понятійного апарату філософування (або принаймні трансформації змісту існуючих понять) у кожен культурну епоху. Нерідко цей процес супроводжується некритичними запозиченнями понять і термінів з інших галузей знання, особливо з наук, які прискорено розвиваються у ХХ і ХХІ століттях і вводять нові поняття й терміни до наукового обігу. Остання обставина досить часто приводить до некоректного застосування наукових понять і термінів у філософських текстах, затьмарюючи їхній зміст. Даний аспект застосування нових понять у сучасному філософуванні і спонукає авторку статті звернутися до аналізу соціокультурних чинників трансформації понятійного апарату філософії на рубежі століть, що й складає мету даної статті.

Основна частина

Проблема трансформації понятійно-термінологічного апарату філософії є перманентно актуа-

льною, оскільки до неї звертаються філософи впродовж усієї історії її розвитку. Дана проблематика завжди розглядається в контексті відповідної історичної та соціокультурної ситуації і зв'язана з рівнем розвитку матеріальної й духовної культури суспільства. Про це свідчить і знаменита гіпотеза Сепіра – Уорфа, згідно з якою, мова і спосіб мислення є взаємозв'язаними. З одного боку, як зазначає відомий сучасний лінгвіст А.Вежбицька, у мові знаходять відображення ті риси позамовної дійсності, які є релевантними для носіїв культури, а з іншого боку, носій мови починає осмислювати світ під кутом зору, підказаним мовою, і «зживається» з концептуалізацією світу, характерною для відповідної культури [1, с.7]. Очевидно, що дане зауваження стосується не лише повсякденних мови і мислення, а й філософського способу філософування, яке виражається через відповідний понятійно-термінологічний апарат. Так, уже в Античності Арістотель, підводячи в «Метафізиці» підсумки розвитку попередніх філософських шкіл від Геракліта до Сократа і Платона, показує, як змінюються поняття, що характеризують буття. Він вводить свої поняття й категорії та уточнює зміст існуючих відповідно до нових знань його епохи.

Епоха Середньовіччя вносить свої корективи в понятійний апарат філософії, зокрема у вченні Августина поняття виступають модусами творіння. Істинним буттям у нього володіє лише Бог і він не може визначатися через поняття. Отже, в серед-