THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF HISTORY AS A SYSTEM OF "MENTAL DIVISIONS" BY ROBERT VIPPER

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The article deals with the methodological scheme introduced by R. Vipper, a well-known historian and historical philosopher. The process of historical cognition, mechanisms and principles of work with historical sources are distinguished in the given article. Topicality of R. Vipper's work is revealed by providing critical analysis of modern results of historical knowledge.

Keywords: socio-cultural determination of social science, the nature of historical cognition, historical relativism, the system of "mental divisions", fundamental historical theories, common notions, categories and facts.

Introduction

The methodological construction of R. Vipper stemmed from the knowledge of real problems of historical research. During his long life, R. Vipper wrote more than 300 works on general history from Antiquity to the present. The views of R. Vipper on the problem of the relation of science and society, the issue of the dependence of the historical science was quite characteristic for the subsequent development of historical, philosophical, and sociological thought. R. Vipper is one of the first historians who formulated, comprehended, and studied complex epistemological problems of historical research and the issues of close interaction of history with culture and society. To a large extent, the wonderful historian anticipated the popular theory of "ideal types" of M. Weber, the concept of "prospects" of K. Mannheim, and the "different levels" of P. Gardiner. The philosophical and methodological ideas of R. Vipper had a noticeable impact on the theoretical ideas of famous historians L. P. Karsavin, V. M. Khvostov, D. M. Petrushovsky.

The aim of the article is to reveal the views of R. Vipper on the structure of historical science as a system of "mental divisions" of the historical past, and the actualization of its theoretical and methodological principles of research.

Research methods. The aim of the article is to reveal the views of R. Vipper on the structure of historical science as a system of "mental divisions" of the historical past, and the actualization of its theoretical and methodological principles of research.

Research results

The study of the influence of modern factors on the writing of history became relevant for historical, philosophical, and sociological thought in the second half of the nineteenth century. The beginning of the problem was laid by the works of N. I. Kareev, N. K. Mikhailovsky, and P. L. Lavrov. For the first time the question was raised in the works of P. L. Lavrov "Historical letters of 1868-1869" and "About the criticism of "Historical letters" (Lavrov 1965, 5-295, 297-328), N. K. Mikhailovsky "What is progress?" (Mihajlovskij 1909, vol. 3, 275-904), "Notes of the layman" (Mihajlovskij 1909, vol. 4, 381-464), and "Letters about the truth and a lie" in works of N. I. Kareev (Kareev 1883, 1895). Well-known scientists made a strong statement of the principle of socio-cultural determinism of social science with all its conclusions, emphasizing the impact on the writing of history, provided by the life and culture of modern society. "Minus some brilliant exceptions, – wrote N. K. Mikhailovsky, – in general moral and political sciences practical life with its roughness must reflect" (Mihajlovskij 1909, 157). Noting the connection of science with social life, historians and sociologists believed that the social determinism of knowledge is not an obstacle to the achievement of truth in social research. N. I. Kareev even claimed that the scientist is able to rise above all kinds of social preferences and extremely negatively assessed the party-evaluation approach in science (Kareev 1883, 383-384). Positivist researchers simplified and often idealized a complex and contradictory picture of the relationship between the scientist and society and did not make appropriate methodological conclusions from the fact of possible destructive external influence on the cognitive activity of the scientist. R. Vipper sharply criticized the epistemological optimism of the positivist methodology of science, accusing it of insufficient attention to the most thinking subject, and concentrated his efforts on revealing the active creative role of the researcher in the process of writing history.

In the crisis of historicism of the nineteenth century, the spread in the science of relativistic ideas of Vipper's theoretical-methodological concept has led historians to the understanding of historical science as "the autobiography society." A deep analysis of the problem of socio-cultural impact on the work of the historian from the standpoint of historical relativism made it possible to join R. Vipper to the well-known conclusion that history is rewritten by each generation and for each intellectual group. Developing the theme of the connection between history and modernity, the scientist presented historiography in a logical way with a system of "mental divisions". By promoting this concept, he put before science a number of essential problems, such as the objectivity of general concepts in history, the problem of historical fact, the question of the relationship between the general and the individual in historical research. From Vipper's point of view, historical description is not actually a reflection of a certain phenomenon of the past, but a mental division of reality from a given angle, the fruit of creative activity of the researcher. "We ourselves make a cut of reality, guided by known, pre-planned features, setting a criterion and a unit of measure for the selection of phenomena", – writes R. Vipper. "It depends on us to narrow or expand the number of features that we will take into account in the description. It depends on us to make
this or that combination" (Vipper 1910, 210-211). According to R. Vipper, mental divisions are made by moving the historian-observer to different points of view in relation to the studied material and independently of it (Vipper 1910, 203-204). Different points of view give different interpretations to the same historical phenomenon. R. Vipper believes that in the study of a certain historical phenomenon the researcher not only artificially pulls its elements into one plane, but also produces the re–verse work: decomposes the phenomenon into component parts, "gives them names, makes a number of "snapshots". Each image receives an independent existence, whereas in reality there was a whole process (Vipper 1910, 203-204).

"Divisions, thus, are in the end "mental experiments on the material", the framework for the perception of impressions, "objectified moments of our psyche", deeply subjective in nature and content (Vipper 1910, 242).

R. Vipper holds the idea of a fundamental gap between the real object of knowledge and its historical image, arguing the inconsistency of the description of a historical phenomenon as an analog of the real fact. Historical description for him is the reduction of many heterogeneous features in one plane, while the real phenomenon is decomposed into an unaccountable mass of disparate elements in time and space. R. Vipper does not identify historical knowledge with historical reality and it is difficult to disagree with it. However, he goes even further – denies at all any similarity between them. Historical description for him is nothing more than fiction, though useful for studying the past, but not as not pretending to reflect the real course of things, not giving the right to assume "that the system will be born and dies like this, it seems to us" (Vipper 1908, 352).

Let us consider the main elements of his concept of history as a system of "mental divisions". According to R. Vipper, we can talk about three types of divisions of historical material: 1) at the level of theories, 2) facts, and 3) general concepts. As the most general divisions are the fundamental socio-historical theories that are the result of the achieved level of historical science as a whole at a certain stage of social development. These divisions are closely related to the political, cultural, material, and other social values developed by society: they are the most important points on which historical theories are based. The scientist points out that general historical concepts as large ideal constructions of the material are characterized by the longest duration. "The generations that work on them, – he writes, – do not find peace until they check this construction, that is, they do not place the entire stock of known data on the emerging ideal drawing" (Vipper 1912, 261). These divisions include the theory of historical progress, rejected by R. Vipper, as well as his proposed instead of comparative historical evolutionary theory, which "contains a new division of phenomena, another formulation of social and historical issues" (Vipper 1900, 207). The connection between history and modernity is most evident in fundamental historical theories. The change in historical theories is, first of all, the result of changes in social life. "New ideas in the interpretation of history, – emphasizes R. Vipper, – in fact, new divisions of phenomena, new angles of view formed by the force of newly emerging social impressions" (Vipper 1912, 148).

Particular historical constructions are more close to the historical reality, but at the same time, they significantly depend on the individual qualities of the researcher, and the degree of his approach to the studied material.

The concept of "mental divisions" of history, declared by R. Vipper, remains relevant and is confirmed by works in the field of social philosophy and historiography of the twentieth century. First of all, it was expressed in the content of several theoretical attempts to typologize and systematize the global social process with the help of formation, technological and socio-cultural "divisions" of reality. All these approaches to history do not coincide with each other, although they intersect with each other. If the first focuses on the analysis of the development of formations as a process of natural history, objective and logical, the second is limited to technical and technological criteria for the development of society, the third approach for the system-forming factor and forming the beginning takes culture and civilization. For Marxist "division" the development of society is an objective and natural process, for technocratic concepts of history the criterion and the main factor of development were changes in technology, for cultural "divisions" of history the main thing is the human dimension associated primarily with culture and the action of social mechanisms. The latest organize society together and provide a certain way of human existence. If the system-forming beginning of the formation is economic relations, the forming beginning of civilization is culture.

The concept of local cultures and civilizations emerged later – in the first quarter of the twentieth century, at a time when humanity has not yet faced the acuteness of global problems and threats or, in the words of A. Toynbee, – global challenges of history, the answer to which can be found not within a particular local culture, and on a global scale, the efforts of all humanity. Thus, the concept of "mental divisions" history of the R. Vipper anticipated further theoretical and methodological researches of famous scientists: O. Spengler, A. Toynbee, P. Sorokin, W. Rostow, J. Galbraith, and D. Bell.

As already noted, another type of "mental division" of R. Vipper is historical facts. The positivist-oriented direction in the methodology of history was abstracted from everything subjective in historical fact. Therefore, R. Vipper was quite right when he wrote that "the previous era in scientific thought too insisted on the "objective" nature of the facts to be our study..." (Vipper 1912, 60-61). The naïvely realistic concept of scientific fact was characteristic primarily of classical positivism and it provoked protest among a number of representatives of Russian historical science. V. O. Klyuchevsky in the course of 1894 "Source studies" pointed out that "the historian does not face the historical fact directly as soon as he takes up a monument of antiquity or looks at it. Historical fact is manifested in the analysis and interpretation of the source" (Klyuchevsky 1959, 479).

Such specialists in the field of methodology of history, as N. I. Kareev and A. S. Lappo-Danilevsky, in their works revealed the ontological specificity of historical fact. However, in general, the problem of fact in theoretical terms in the Russian historiography of the early XX century before R. Vipper was not formulated. His merit is to pose the problem of fact in historical science as a heuristic construction. In contrast to the positivist simplified notions of fact, he emphasizes the interpretative nature of the fact of science, its dependence on the conceptual system in which the fact is included. Insisting on the elastic nature of
historical facts. R. Vipper writes that they "rebuild", change color and shape, disappear and grow depending on our perspective, on the angle of view (Vipper 1912, 29).

There can be no question, says the historian, of a direct reflection of reality in the facts of science: "the groups that we call facts do not constitute anything given to us that we passively assimilate or simply open. The consciousness of a known fact of the past is the result, first of all, of our ability, of our habit of perceiving impressions in a known grouping, in a known cohesion, connection" (Vipper 1912, 31). It would be a simplification to present the case in such a way that the scientist completely denies the objective nature of historical facts, and invents facts of his own free will. On the contrary, every fact, according to R. Vipper, is associated with specific elements of reality. The historian extracts certain elements of the past reality and is bound by them; his freedom is manifested only in the construction of these elements in accordance with the chosen angle of view. Recognizing the right of each researcher to his or her own interpretation of the facts, the methodology points out that "facts exist for one eye and are absent for another" (Vipper 1910, 32). The selection of facts and their construction, according to R. Vipper, are made on the basis of the historian's a priori decision and depend on his preliminary theoretical setup. Beyond interpretation, the fact is nothing; it simply does not exist. Here the scientist poses an important problem of correlation of empirical and theoretical levels in historical cognition, their unity, and interrelation. Every description, according to R. Vipper, every enumeration of facts is in the service of a certain organizing theory; in turn, every theory – the formula of specific series – is somehow connected with the Empire (Vipper 1910, 30-47). Therefore, historical facts, being one of the varieties of our "mental divisions", are necessary for the knowledge of subjective by nature heuristic design. This division is in accordance with the more general division of reality, the division at the level of theory. Under the influence of historical or social theory as a general setting, appearing not so much at the end of the work, but on the eve of knowledge, "there is not even a selection, but the creation of facts in our mind, their formulation according to the drawing, according to the architectural lines of the known system" (Vipper 1910, 33).

Thus, R. Vipper shows that actual knowledge can exist only in connection with a certain theoretical concept in history and that the same facts can have a completely different interpretation and different meanings depending on the categorical apparatus used, and on the worldview of the cognizing subject. The scientist is certainly right when he argues that historical research never begins with a bare statement of facts, with a simple accumulation of empirical material, but assumes a certain theoretical position and value system of the researcher. However, it is necessary to point to another point in the interpretation of historical facts, ignored by R. Vipper. We are talking about the invariant side of the structure of the fact of reality, which does not allow the historian produces excessive subjectivization and relativization of the empirical basis of the study.

The problem of historical fact is one of the most important methodological problems of historical knowledge. From the point of view of the naive-realistic vision of the fact, it is a real fragment, an event of the past; from the point of view of the methodological approach, the fact is the result of historical research. The concept of historical fact by R. Vipper includes ontological and epistemological (heuristic) interpretations of the fact. In our opinion, one of the main methodological problems of historical knowledge lies in the "double" nature of historical fact; the complex relationship between the facts of reality and the facts of science complicates the study and causes a significant obstacle to the knowledge of the historical past. The position that a social fact is created, "constructed" by a scientist on the basis of certain public sources – historical evidence, is widely spread in the modern methodology of social cognition and anthropology (Berger 1995, 13). If we agree that the historian does not work with the phenomena, events, and processes themselves, but with critically analyzed, revised and evaluated historical documents, then we must admit that he is dealing with pre-generalized and interpreted facts. Since interpretation and evaluation are later stages of historical research, facts should be considered constructive elements or products of knowledge. Emphasizing the creative activity of the historian and the purposeful nature of historical knowledge, as well as the possibility of the formation of different knowledge based on the study of the same sources, depending on the objectives of the scientist, can be recognized as having the right to life a subjective version of historical constructivism. The facts are not extracted by the historian from historical sources in a ready form but are the result of intellectual activity, a certain research procedure. Facts get different understanding, interpretations, and significance depending on the conceptual scheme of constructing historical knowledge.

The so-known in history of World War II episode of the attack of Japanese aircraft on December 7, 1941, on the American military base in Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the fleet located there, can be considered a historical fact reflecting the objective event of the past. However, it functions as an element of two overlapping conceptual structures, which, however, does not lead to the elimination of its truth. On the one hand, the "bad Japanese", without declaring war, treacherously attacked the United States, on the other hand, if we include this fact in the historical context will open, emphasizing O. Buzina, "two inconsistencies." A few months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, United States President Franklin Roosevelt imposed an oil embargo on Japan. But, as you know, Japan is an island state that does not have its own sources of fuel. It imported oil from the United States, which was then the largest producer of "black gold" in the world. Thus, depriving the Japanese of fuel and thereby leaving their ships and planes without fuel, F. Roosevelt put before the Japanese alternative: either to surrender without war or try to seize the energy resources of Southeast Asia, attacking the colonies of Great Britain and America. "As bait, – notes O. Buzina, – in pearl Harbor were left only OUTDATED (!) battleship ships built mainly during the First World War. American aircraft carrier fleet – the basis of modern naval forces – by a strange coincidence, was not in the base, and on the high seas. But American public opinion has received an impressive picture of the defeat of the whole squadron of new "Maine" – decrepit ships bombed by the Japanese" (Buzina 2014, 171-172). "Maine" was called the most outdated and unsuccessful cruiser of the American Navy, sunk at the end of the nineteenth century from an explosion under mysterious circumstances (1898). This event was the occasion for the beginning of the American-Spanish war for
Cuba. In historical fact is a historical description, which includes the element of interpretation, giving the opportunity to separate the true from the false description of really significant for history from insignificant.

And finally, the third kind of "mental divisions" in history, according to R. Vipper is general historical concepts. This type of divisions is considered by him an example of the main categories of historical science. Despite the recognition of integrity, and unity of life, the historian believes, we can observe it and describe it only in separate manifestations, using different types of divisions and autopsies (Vipper 1910, 208). The most convenient divisions of the historical process are the categories of "economy", "politics", "culture", "law", "social system". Materialistic and idealistic concepts, from the point of view of R. Vipper, make an irreparable mistake, "turning our "divisions", in fact, into solid units of life..." (Vipper 1910, 209). On closer examination of historical categories, it turns out that this is wrong simply because these concepts are very unstable and fluctuating, and it is impossible to determine their boundaries accurately. Hence, concludes R. Vipper, it is obvious that we do not have a given in reality the division of phenomena in the categories of "economy", "politics", "culture", etc., we ourselves make a cut of reality on the planned in advance signs. "That is why our categories, – he writes, – are at the same time vague, have no clear outlines, and are wide and comprehensive" (Vipper 1910, 211). Historical categories, therefore, are only subjective "mental divisions" of reality. "The previous analysis," R. Vipper writes, "led us to the conclusion that the categories of economic, political, social, religious, etc. life form very important and convenient for groups, descriptions, rows of pictures, selected on the same grounds; but these our divisions and compositions cannot be compared as moments, stages and phases of the movement of social life; it is impossible to identify categories as a whole with groups of the phenomena of initial and the phenomena of derivatives" (Vipper 1910, 231).

R. Vipper's criticism of the categorial apparatus of historical science raises certain objections. The study of how conceptual schemes arise, and the elucidation of their functions is an important task of the theory of historical cognition. One of the first questions about the ways of constructing such schemes and their role in the formation, development, and functioning of strict scientific theories was investigated by V.S. Stepin (Stepin 2009). In historical knowledge, the process of constructing theoretical schemes and developed theories involves conceptualization, the correct understanding of which requires the study of historical abstractions. Some abstractions are introduced initially only for theoretical reasons and may not yet have relevant empirical evidence. Other abstractions are created on the basis of empirical research most often in connection with the discovery and use of new sources. The process of conceptualization in historical knowledge has a number of specific features that reflect the features of the studied fragment of the past.

R. Vipper drew attention to these features of historical conceptualization. At the same time, his conclusion that historical concepts are only abstractions that are not connected with historical reality, only tools of its ordering seems not quite proven. It is fair to note that the concepts coarsen reality, that they are a product of human thought, and the historian ignores their objective content. The process of formation of concepts in historical knowledge is really very complex, its result is a known distraction from historical reality. But this process does not mean arbitrary operations on the historical past, on the contrary, it becomes possible due to the close connection between the past and the present. Without transferring all wealth of the phenomena of the past and the present, the historical concept is based on the repetition of certain moments of the social phenomena. The historical concept is the result of the generalization of certain features and relations inherent in the past reality, although the latter does not appear in the concept in its "pure form". The historical concept is not only an instrument of knowledge of the past but also the result of a long process of mastering the historical reality by scientists. Vipper's interpretation of the main historical categories as instruments of cognition or ideal constructions, subjective in nature and essence, found expression in the methodological representations of Russian historians of the period under consideration.

L. P. Karsavin, for example, refused, referring to R. Vipper, to consider the causal interaction of the facts of the historical process, considering them only abstractions (Karsavin 1920, 18-19). V. M. Khvostov was against considering historical facts as special entities, qualifying them as a product of our thought, dissecting the material of experience, in which everything is merged (Khvostov 1914, 47 48,144 145). According to D. M. Petrushevsky, general concepts in history have the purpose not to display reality, but to construct it to solve certain cognitive problems (Petrushevsky 1917, 14).

R. Vipper's understanding of historical science as a system of "mental divisions", quite fit into the direction of methodological searches of liberal historiography of the early twenties century. He created an original and independent methodological concept, revealing the essential role played by external factors in historical knowledge. He managed to show the place of the researcher's value, and worldview position in the formation of theories, general concepts, and facts in the study, the dependence of approaches to the past, and the vision of history on the cultural environment in which the historian is formed. At the same time, emphasizing the creative activity of the subject in the process of reconstruction of historical reality. R. Vipper so hypertrophied the value of cognitive attitudes of the researcher that questioned the very objective content of the results of research, subordinating it entirely to the individual point of view. The historian can really consider the object of his research in any aspect depending on his scientific and worldview positions, and the interests of his social group. For example, in studies on the life and work of Napoleon, it is easy to notice that, despite the invariance of the main historical facts, not only their selection but also the coverage of the figure of Bonaparte, his historical assessment, the definition of the place of the general and later the Emperor in French history differ from different authors. The reason for this is not only the sympathy or antipathy of researchers but their methods and techniques of research, as well as the original conceptual scheme (Tarle 1992, 414-421). For some historians, the main guidelines are set by moral and psychological concepts and patterns of behavior of the characters; for other scientists, the parameters of the study are formed by appropriate research programs: socio-cultural categories,
concepts of revolution, progress, civilization, and world history. Defining the research objectives, the historian can arbitrarily set the internal relations objectively inherent in the object. The subjective goals of the historian with which he approaches the object of study do not necessarily lead to subjectivism; on the contrary, thanks to this purposefulness, the scientist is able to comprehend more deeply and fully the intrinsic connections and properties of the object.

Discussion

In light of the discussion of understanding R. Vipper the impact of modernity on historical knowledge and its interpretation of historical science as a system of "mental divisions," the question is, the severity of which was also felt by the scientist himself: whether it is possible fundamentally to the achievement of objective truth in history? "Are we approaching by such turns, inclinations, and deviations to the truth?". In principle, says the historian, "if the truth doesn't understand something still. If the truth makes possible the exact adaptation of the available data to the possibly developed, mental vision with the possible diverse formulation of questions, then we go constantly to the truth and constantly achieve it... to the extent of sensitivity and thoughtfulness of the society that creates and develops science for itself" (Vipper 1912, 144-145). The scientist rightly points to the procedural nature of historical truth; and the gradual movement to it, and finds out the social background and subjective conditions of understanding the phenomena of the past.

Conclusion

In historical cognition, the historian deals with relative truth, since historical science, due to a number of features of subject-object relations, cannot fully use the criterion of practice, and the work of the historian is carried out within a certain theoretical system that provides conceptual means of studying the past. However, despite the subjective and relativistic solution of a number of theoretical issues of historical knowledge, the methodological concept of R. Vipper is a qualitatively new level in the development of historical science of the first half of the twentieth century. The Problems posed in the methodology of the history of R. Vipper are relevant today and are widely discussed in modern scientific literature.

References


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ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКО-МЕТОДОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ КОНЦЕПЦИЯ ИСТОРИИ КАК СИСТЕМЫ «УМСТВЕННЫХ РАЗРЕЗОВ» РОБЕРТА ВИППЕРА

Анотация. В статье рассматривается методологическая конструкция выделяющегося историка и философа истории Р. Ю. Виппера, исследуется процесс исторического познания, выявлается механизмы и принципы реальной работы ученого с историческими материалами. На основе критического анализа современных результатов исторического познания показана актуальность научного наследия ученого для современной науки.

Ключевые слова: социокультурная проблематика общественной науки, природа исторического познания, историосфера, система «умственных разрезов», исторические теории, общее понятие, категории и факты.

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ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКО-МЕТОДОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ КОНЦЕПЦИЯ ИСТОРИИ КАК СИСТЕМЫ «РОЗУМОВИХ РОЗРИЗІВ» РОБЕРТА ВІППЕРА

Вступ. Методологічні побудови Р. Ю. Віппера виправляли із знання реальних проблем історичного дослідження. За своє дозві життя він написав понад 300 робіт із загальної історії від античності до сучасності. Поглибля Р. Ю. Віппер на проблему співвідношення науки і суспільства, питання залежності історичної науки від сучасності виявився досить характерними для подальшого розвитку історико-філософсько-соціологічної думки. Р. Ю. Віппер – один із перших вітчизняних істориків, який сформулював, осмислив та досліджував складні гносеологічні проблеми історичного дослідження, питання тісної взаємодії історії з культурою та життям суспільства. Метою дослідження є розкриття уявлення Р. Ю. Віппера на структурі історичної науки як системи «умствених розрезів», історичного минулого, актуалізації його теоретико-методологічних засад дослідження, методології дослідження. Як методи та принципи дослідження в роботі використовуються системний та міждисциплінарний підхід, а також теоретико-пізнавальна концепція соціокультурної обумовленості наукового знання. Результати дослідження.
Розмініна Р. Ю. Віппером історичної науки як системи «розумових розрізів», цілком висувавася у напрям методологічних пошуків ліберальної історіографії початку ХХ століття. Він створив оригінальну та самостійну методологічну концепцію, розкрив тістину роль, яку відіграють зовнішні чинники в історичному пізнанні. Йому вдалося показати місце цінності, світоглядної позиції дослідника у формуванні теорії, загальних понять та фактів у дослідженні, залежність прийомів до минулого та бачення історії від культурного середовища, в якому формується історія. Обговорення. У світлі розглянутої розмініні Р. Ю. Віппером апліку сучасності на історичне пізнання його трактування історичної науки як системи «розумових розрізів» виникає питання, гостроту якого відчуваю і сам учені: Чому можливо принципово досягнення об'єктивної істини в історії? Чи важкосямося ми шляхом таких повертів, нахиля і відхилен до істини? В принципі, відповідає історія, так, якщо під істиною не розуміти щось нерухоме.

Висновки. В історичному пізнанні має справу з відносною істинною, ось історична наука, з низькими особливостями суб'єктно-об'єктивних відносин, неспроможна повною мірою використовувати критерії практики, а робота історика здійснюється у межах левої теоретичної системи, що забезпечує концептуальні засоби вивчення минулого. Однак, незважаючи на суб'єктивість та релативість вирішення низки теоретичних питань історичного пізнання, методологічна концепція Р. Ю. -- Віппера є яскравим новим рівнем у розвитку вітчизняної історичної науки першої половини ХХ століття.

Ключові слова: соціокультурна обумовленість суспільної науки, природа історичного пізнання, історичний релятивізм, система розумових розрізів, історичні теорії, загальні поняття, категорії та факти.

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ІДЕНТИЧНІСТЬ ТА КОЛЛЕКТИВНА ДЯ — СИСТЕМНИЙ ПІДХІД

Хмельницька гуманітарно-педагогічна академія

Анотація. Розглянуто феномен ідентичності у процесі формування колективної дії у суспільствах, що мають статус «Мік». Такий статус є умовою формування Homo, що напівщирився на виживання і припиння відновлених умов. Враховуючи ціннісні орієнтири, доведено, що суспільство, колективна дія якої спрямована на розвиток і життя, використовуючи свободу, вибере цивілізаційний шлях і за його боротьбою. Це зумовлено правлінням людини до життя, наповненого динамічними змінами. Чого не можемо сказати про суспільства, які перебувають у топтальній системі. Визначено роль історичної пам’яті і колективного невісідомого у процесі міфологізації свідомості. Зокрема доведено, що міфологізація свідомості, відсутність об’єктивного аналізу історичних подій має негативні наслідки у колективних суб’єктів, витягнувши з того, що вони є активними учасниками процесу державотворення та історії. Феномен ідентичності у статті розглянуто країн призму суспільно-політичних і соціально-економічних процесів, що відбуваються у країні й світі в загалом, адже вони стають орієнтиром глобалізованого світу, що визначає колективну ідентичність відповідного суб’єкта. Наслідком такої визначеності є увага на розкриття усієї соціальної системи. З метою детального вивчення проблеми і обґрунтування зроблених висновків використовувалося наступні методи: 1) загальнонаукові: порівняння, аналіз, синтез, абстрагування та конкретизація; 2) спеціальні: історичний метод, цивілізаційний метод та біхевіористичний.

Ключові слова: людина, суспільство, історична пам’ять, свідомість, колективна дія, міфологізація, глобалізація, ідентичність.

Вступ

XXI століття для тоталітарних суспільств стало періодом суцільних випробувань, основним з яких є боротьба за свободу. Серед основних умов, що порушують питання останньої, є процес глобалізації, європеїзації окремих країн, а також сформована століттям полікультурність. Крім зазначених умов, необхідне значення у питаннях ідентичності та колективної дії мають колективне несвідоме та історична пам’ять. У рамках колективного несвідомого формуються міфи, вибудується міфологізація свідомості, яка, в свою чергу, виробляє міфічну історію, а та – стає причиною невідповідної історичної пам’яті. Воно є від сучасних історичних ученнях настільки дієві, що вони стають колективної пам’яті. Зазначене положення дещо заперечує самобутність історії, а отже, редукується історично знання до колективної пам’яті (Мозгова 2021, 20-23).

Наступну особливість зазначеної проблеми є її соціальність, адже людина, творячи себе протягом життя та обираючи приоритети, послуговується ідентичністю. Ідентичність є знаком і силою, що структурує новий інший світ, у якому людина буде почавати себе комфортно і вивчені. Реалізація такої ідентичності є визначною для суспільства, що не перебувають у статусі «Мік». Цей статус, з одною суттю, є широким, але у статті ми спеціально не будемо його звуковувати. Це спрямовано визначенню і формуванню мети колективної дії.

Отже, вищеописане актуалізує зазначену проблему особливо для суспільств і держав, що займають статус «Мік».

Мета дослідження

Мета статті обумовлює необхідність комплексного аналізу підходів до феномену ідентичності у частині формування колективної дії. Зазначена мета визначає позоонологічну і праксіологічну оздоровлення нової типу Homo.

Визначена мета передбачає вирішення низки завдань: з’ясування сути основних понять, окреслень темою, що мають важливе значення у процесі становлення людини; визначення місця свободи як можливості діяти; вироблення інтерпретаційної схеми колективної дії для процесів творення Homo через ідентичність.

Методологія дослідження

У роботі використані такі загальнонаукові методи, як порівняння, аналіз, синтез, абстрагування та конкретизації. 

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