FUNCTIONAL SAFETY AND SURVIVABILITY OF INFORMATION CONTROL ELLIPTIC-CURVE-BASED SYSTEMS: MODELS AND METHODS

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Abstract. There is an analysis of functional safety and survivability of information control systems relying on elliptic curve-based calculations. Time required for solving a discrete logarithm on GF(p) elliptic curves was worked out. Presented were aspects of the use of FPGA systems whose calculations were based on Rademacher-Krestenson’s remaining classes and parallel summing.

Key words: information control system, elliptic curve, functional safety, survivability, system of Rademacher-Krestenson’s residual classes.

1. Introduction

Economic potential growth of every country is closely connected with technological security. One of the most important factors ensuring this safety is information technology (IT), which is actually a tool for designing and implementing infrastructure security management system [1-3]. There is a growing attention paid to information protection and privacy issues [4-6]. Theoretically every fifth failure of nuclear power equipment or every fifth failure in space-rocket technology might be caused by neglected additional
safety deficits, that is information control systems (ICS). This is clearly an international issue and so there have been many international conferences held with respect to IT survivability and functional safety: DESSERT, DSN, EDCC, ESREL, SAM, SAFECOMP among others [3]. These researches along with development of integrated remote sensors constitute one of the leading directions in science and one of the greatest challenges for 21st century engineering. It was recognized as such, defined by National Science Foundation (NSF) and proposed to be realized in accordance with relevant Resolution of Ukrainian NAN Presidium. Another distinguished class comprises ICS based on elliptic curves (ICSEC) where cryptographic operations are carried out on elliptic curves - elliptic curve cryptography device (ECCD). This fact evokes need of designing, implementing and further development of appropriate models and methods for optimizing ICSEC survivability and functional safety. The aim of this article is to assess the functional safety and survivability of ECCDs. Procedures concerning research and assessment of the functional safety and survivability were based on specifically designed models increasing speed of basic arithmetic operations on GF(p) elliptic curves (ECs) [7]. One of basic factors determining encryption/decryption time and consequently safety of ECCD is the speed of EC point’s addition process. All the most efficient algorithms, known today, for solving discrete logarithms exploit the addition process as one of the main calculations. It appears obvious that the EC point’s addition process directly determines the time needed for solving the discrete logarithm problem and consequently sets the security level.

2. Model evaluation of functional security and survivability of ICSEC

Based on risk-oriented model evaluation of ICSEC safety mentioned in [8-11] the following is true

\[ R(t) = p(t)D, \]  

where non-dimensional value \( R(t) \) - risk over time \( t \) related to some event, a value which is often referred to as safety indicator;

\( p(t) \) - probability of the event, in other words probability that ICSEC enters dangerous state within time \( t \);

\( D \) - coefficient, determined by management object, representing a set of all possible unwanted results caused by the event.

Let’s assume fault-tolerant multiprocessor ICS [9] performance \( P \) to ICSEC state evaluation ratio as a base and let’s introduce the following components:

- \( P_{\text{fail}} \) - probability that ICSEC works without failures;
- \( f_i \) - safety function, that is the smallest subset of ICSEC functions of the highest priority responsible for preventing the system from entering dangerous state;
- \( P_s \) - ICSEC performance required for safety function realization and under which there is a fault;
- \( m \) - total number of safety functions;
- \( P_{\text{ds}} \) - probability that ICSEC enters dangerous state within time \( t \);
- \( n \) - total number of processor devices in ICSEC;
- \( n_{\text{ECCD}} \) - number of ECCD;
- \( x \) - state vector of ICSEC;
- \( X_{ik} \) - set corresponding to dangerous states of ICSEC;
- \( a_i \) and \( a_j \) - vector \( x \) components corresponding to \( i \)th processor device state and \( j \)th ECCD (\( a_i = a_j = 0 \) - for failure, \( a_i = a_j = 1 \) - for working capacity);
- \( P_i \) and \( P_j \) - performance of \( i \)th processor device and \( j \)th ECCD;
- \( P_s \) - performance of ICSEC in state corresponding to vector \( x \).

Taking questions [9] into account the following is true:

\[ P_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i P_j + \sum_{j=1}^{n_{\text{ECCD}}} a_j P_j \leq P_s, \]  

\[ p_s(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i(t) \mathcal{E}_{x_i x_a}, \]  

where:

\[ p_i(t) \mathcal{E}_{x_i x_a} = \prod_{j=1}^{n} P_i \mathcal{E}_{x_i x_a} \left( 1 - P \right)^{1-x_j}, \]

which makes it possible to calculate the probability of an event that ICSEC enters dangerous state within time \( t \) caused by efficiency decrease - a result of ECCD failures.

3. The fast point addition process reduces | decreases the discrete logarithm solving time

Taking into account complexity of calculations and expense of addition two points on an EC it turns out reasonable to use mixed representation where one of the coordinates is an affine coordinate and the other is a projective one. In such a case calculating the addition of points [12] comes down to 11 multiplications, without addition and subtraction field operations. These two do not contribute much to the overall calculation time. In cryptographic devices based on curves there are large amount of modular multiplications while traditional approach to multiplication in computers does not provide satisfying results. Therefore calculations based on Rademacher-Krestenson’s bases were used as much more effective. Krestenson’s algorithm allows multiplication to be simplified to addition processes using previously generated tables [13]. Assume a multiplication of two numbers \( x \) and \( y \) modulo number \( p \). In the multiplier model \( X \) and \( Y \) are represented as binary sequences.

\[ X = x_{i-1}2^{i-1} + x_{i-2}2^{i-2} + \ldots + x_12 + x_0 \]

\[ Y = y_{i-1}2^{i-1} + y_{i-2}2^{i-2} + \ldots + y_12 + y_0 \]

In order to find multiplication result of the above a matrix, shown in table 1, where \( m_{ik} = 2^{\alpha k} \mod n \), is constructed.

The product of the numbers, that is coordinates \( X \) i \( Y \), is calculated according to formula:

\[ X \cdot Y \mod n = \sum_{k=0}^{i} m_{ik} \mod n, \]

where \( x_i \), \( y_i = 1 \). That means \( m_{ik} \) lies at the intersection of column and row for which respective \( x_i \) i \( y_i \) equal 1.

The problem of addition multi-bit numbers was solved by using an algorithm presented in the work [14].
allowing to divide multi-bit numbers into words of specified length and also parallel addition [15] of all the words resulting from that division. The above

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I</th>
<th>X_1</th>
<th>X_2</th>
<th>X_3</th>
<th>X_4</th>
<th>X_5</th>
<th>X_6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X_1</td>
<td>m_{1, 1} X_1</td>
<td>m_{1, 2} X_1</td>
<td>m_{1, 3} X_1</td>
<td>m_{1, 4} X_1</td>
<td>m_{1, 5} X_1</td>
<td>m_{1, 6} X_1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ...
| X_2 | m_{2, 1} X_2 | m_{2, 2} X_2 | m_{2, 3} X_2 | m_{2, 4} X_2 | m_{2, 5} X_2 | m_{2, 6} X_2 |
| | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ...
| X_3 | m_{3, 1} X_3 | m_{3, 2} X_3 | m_{3, 3} X_3 | m_{3, 4} X_3 | m_{3, 5} X_3 | m_{3, 6} X_3 |
| | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ...
| X_4 | m_{4, 1} X_4 | m_{4, 2} X_4 | m_{4, 3} X_4 | m_{4, 4} X_4 | m_{4, 5} X_4 | m_{4, 6} X_4 |

Table 1

Determining the transformation matrix module based on Rademacher–Krestenson

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GF(p)</th>
<th>Number addition / s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>319444,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>234042,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>185344,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>148550,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>125000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>107142,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The point addition unit was tested on FPGA Stratix III EP3SL150F1152I4SL system. Generating results and synthesis allowed clock frequency as high as 44 MHz. Table 2 shows speed results for the addition unit for curves of various sizes.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GF(p)</th>
<th>Time (s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GF(p)</th>
<th>Time (s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such addition unit was used for encryption by the ElGamal algorithm with the use of a public key [16]. The test shows encryption of a 1024 kB file with keys of various lengths. Table 3 shows the results. Table 4 shows results for a similar test in the same conditions except that in this case the point addition calculations were carried out in a traditional manner.

4. Construction and tests of elliptic curve point addition unit in FPGA structures

The point addition unit in FPGA structure. Basic numerical operations were based on previously explained parallel addition and modulo multiplication in Krestenson’s bases. A schematic of its structure is depicted in Fig.1.

Fig. 1. Unit adding the point GF(p)

As we can clearly see from tables 3 and 4 implementation of Krestenson’s bases addition strategy, in an adequate environment, almost doubles the encryption speed of traditional approach. Fig. 2 shows times needed to encrypt a file using keys of various length.

Fig. 2. 1024 KB of information encryption by ElGamal algorithm using various methods of adding points in GF(p)
5. Solving a discrete logarithm problem

Knowing the impact of Krestenson’s residuals system on the efficiency of point addition process we can focus on the strength of cryptographic algorithms based on higher order fields.

Fig. 3. A unit realizing Pollard rho algorithm using calculations based on Krestenson’s bases

Schematic in Fig.3 shows a hardware model for Pollard’s Rho algorithm realization in FPGA system – a process directly determining the speed of the algorithm functioning. The addition unit uses algorithms based on Rademacher–Krestenson’s remaining classes.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GF(p)</th>
<th>Iterations /s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>321678,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>235294,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>186147,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>149090,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>125391,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>107438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Speed tests were carried out on Stratix III EP3SL150F1152I4SL, results and synthesis allowed clock frequency 44 MHz. Table 5 shows speed scores for hardware FPGA unit. Fig. 4 shows results of rho Pollard calculation speed tests.

Fig. 4. Number of iterations done by Pollard’s rho algorithm for various curves GF(p)

Consider the scores gathered in table 5 and the equation for average estimated solving time of a discrete logarithm by rho Pollard √(πn⁄2) method.

Table 6 presents estimated strength of a cryptographic algorithm, determined by discrete logarithm problem solution, for curves of various sizes. The presented results refer to a single FPGA unit realizing a single random walk. A parallel rho Pollard algorithm increases the speed of finding discrete logarithm proportionally to the number of used random walks. The method relies on multiple random walks done simultaneously. The sense of this idea comes down to having many units, each realizing its own random walk and writing data into a common base. Many such units working parallel result in a linearly higher speed of finding points on random walks. A model consisting of 120 programmable FPGA units [17], described in work [18], makes up so called COPACOBANA FPGA cluster [18] which carries out parallel Pollard’s Rho algorithm and generates large numbers of iterations per second – shown in table 7.

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GF(p)</th>
<th>Iterations /s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>38601398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>28235294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>22337662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>17890909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>15047022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>12892562</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 shows the strength of cryptographic algorithm with 120 random walks.

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GF(p)</th>
<th>Time (day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>0,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>100790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>3,5*10^18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>1,4*10^12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>4,9*10^15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Conclusion

The article comprises an analysis of the force of a cryptographic algorithm as well as functional security of cryptographic systems based on GF(p). Implementation of calculations relying on Krestenson’s bases and parallel addition resulted in two times higher throughput with the use ElGamala method. Fast addition algorithms allow us to test and verify the safety of ECCD. Functional safety and survivability of ICSEC based algorithm were tested with the use of previously described methods. The proposed system realizing
calculations on ECs and taking advantage of Krestenson’s bases may reach even three times faster random walk realization for certain curves. As it has already been discussed, the force of a cryptographic algorithm is 27 days for elliptic curve \( GF(92) \) and 3.8\( \times 10^9 \) years for \( GF(160) \) elliptic curve. The strength is calculated using a cryptanalysis system based on 120 FPGA units. There are other efficient methods for increasing performance of implementation of elliptic curve cryptography, which are scheduled to be carried out in the future.

References


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дискретного логарифма эллиптической кривой над полем GF(p). Освещены аспекты применения устройств ППВМ, в которых вычисления основаны на использовании системы остаточных классов Радемахера-Крестенсона и параллельного суммирования.

Ключевые слова: информационно-управляющая система, эллиптическая кривая, функциональная безопасность, живучесть, система остаточных классов Радемахера-Крестенсона.

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**КЛАСИФІКАЦІЯ ТРИРОЗРЯДНИХ ЕЛЕМЕНТАРНИХ ФУНКЦІЙ ДЛЯ КРИПТОГРАФІЧНОГО ПЕРЕТВОРЕННЯ ІНФОРМАЦІЇ**

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**Анотація.** У даній статті представлена класифікація трирозрядних елементарних функцій для криптографічного перетворення інформації в залежності від складності елементарних функцій та способу перетворення інформації елементарними функціями кожної групи.

**Ключові слова:** трирозрядні елементарні функції, матричні операції, розширені матричні операції, схема реалізації.