AUTOMATED SIMULATION ENCRYPTION NANODEVICES

— This article implements the method of automated nanoelectronic encryption modules. Currently, cryptographic equipment is practically not protected from electromagnetic attacks and information decryption, as it is crea complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor microtechnology. To increase the error encryption devices, the article uses a system of automated design of nanodevices based on quantum cellular automata using majoritaria consuption of the nanodevices developed in the work does not exceed 3 aerial vehicles equipped with the nanodevices developed in the article are completely electromagnetic attacks. The results of automated modeling and verification using a computer design system QCADesigne fully confirmed the effectiveness of introducing single encryption devices of unmanned systems


I. INTRODUCTION
Power analysis attacks were introduced in [1], [6] - [8], [10].In fact, power and electromagnetic ( side-channels are the most important ones for implementation of block ciphers.The power consumption as well as the EM field surrounding a encryption module may leak a significant amount of information about the private key.The power consumption as well as the EM field that is caused by the current flowing in a cryptographic circuit implemented in complementary metal semiconductor (CMOS) leak information about the private key [1].This current is mainly caused by the charging or discharging of the c interconnected wires.

II. BASES OF QUANTUM СELLULAR
Quantum-dot cellular automata (QCA) consist of a dielectric cell (20x20) nm with four quantum semiconductor dots 5 nm, located in the corners, and two mobile electrons.Their only dependent on a finite set of cell vicinity of defined cell [2], [9].An isolated cell provides tunneling junctions with the potential barriers.They are controlled by local electric fields that are raised to prohibit electron movement and lowered to allow electron movement.Consequently, an isolated cell can have one of three states.A null state occurs when the barrier is lowered and the mobile electrons are free to localize on any dot.The other two states are polarizations that occur when National Aviation University, Kyiv, Ukraine oleksandr.melnyk@npp.nau.edu.ua,ORCID 0000-0003-1072 viktoriia.kozarevych@npp.nau.edu.ua,ORCID 0000-0002-4380article implements the method of automated simulation and design of new non nanoelectronic encryption modules.Currently, cryptographic equipment is practically not protected from electromagnetic attacks and information decryption, as it is created according to outdated semiconductor microtechnology.To increase the error encryption devices, the article uses a system of automated design of nanodevices based on quantum majoritarian principles of their operation.Automated simulation proved that the consuption of the nanodevices developed in the work does not exceed 3,810 -23 J. Therefore, unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with the nanodevices developed in the article are completely electromagnetic attacks.The results of automated modeling and verification using a computer design system QCADesigne fully confirmed the effectiveness of introducing single-electron nanodevices into encryption devices of unmanned systems.The proposed logic takes advantage of low power consumption dot cellular automata together with complicated clocking circuits as a paradigm of nanotechnology advances in encryption engineering.cellular automata; majority gate; D-type flip-flop; shift Power analysis attacks were introduced in [1], [6] electromagnetic (EM) channels are the most important ones for implementation of block ciphers.The power consumption as well as the EM field surrounding a module may leak a significant amount of information about the private key.The power as the EM field that is caused by the current flowing in a cryptographic circuit complementary metal-oxideleak information about the private key [1].This current is mainly caused by the charging or discharging of the capacitances of ELLULAR AUTOMATA dot cellular automata (QCA) devices consist of a dielectric cell (20x20) nm with four quantum semiconductor dots 5 nm, located in the corners, and two mobile electrons.Their position is only dependent on a finite set of cell-values in the ].An isolated cell provides tunneling junctions with the potential barriers.They are controlled by local electric fields that are raised to prohibit electron movement and lowered to allow electron movement.Consequently, three states.A null state occurs when the barrier is lowered and the mobile electrons are free to localize on any dot.The other two states are polarizations that occur when the barrier is raised, and serve to minimize the energy state of the cell.Probab of polarization state can be correlated with charge density of each quantum dot, and can be found with the help of formula: where i  is the electric charge density of each quantum dot of the cell.
Figure 1 shows basic QCA cell, its two possible orientations and polarization of electrons Placing cells next to each other in a line and allowing them to interact we can provide flowing of a data down such wire.There are two methods of wire construction in dependence on 45 degree or 90 degree cell orientation theoretically, bun on practice it is difficult to manufactured nano different orientation [3].
Different gates can be constructed with QCA to compute various logic and arithmetic functions.The and design of new non-radiating nanoelectronic encryption modules.Currently, cryptographic equipment is practically not protected from ted according to outdated semiconductor microtechnology.To increase the error-free operation of encryption devices, the article uses a system of automated design of nanodevices based on quantum n principles of their operation.Automated simulation proved that the J. Therefore, unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with the nanodevices developed in the article are completely protected from electromagnetic attacks.The results of automated modeling and verification using a computer design electron nanodevices into The proposed logic takes advantage of low power consumption together with complicated clocking circuits as a paradigm of shift nanoregister.
the barrier is raised, and serve to minimize the energy state of the cell.Probability of cell is in one of polarization state can be correlated with charge density of each quantum dot, and can be found with The output cell will polarized to the majority of polarization of input cells.The Boolean expression for majority function with inputs By fixing the polarization of any one input of the majority gate as logic 0 or logic 1, we obtain AND gate or an OR gate respectively: ,1) .
Creation of a fixed cell can be done within manufactured process and constant signals do not need to be routed within the circuit

III. ENERGETIC ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
A power consumption (e.g. the side channel) of a encryption module depends on many parameters.Only one of them is the private key.However, the fact that the side-channel output depends on the private key is often sufficient to reveal it.In order to exploit this dependency between the side output and the private key, an attacker usually builds a model of the side channel.This model is typically not very complex.In fact, attacks conducted in practice have shown that very simple often sufficient to reveal the private key.Several countermeasures to power and EM attacks have been proposed so far; however, each technique may lead to design complexity, more power consumption, size and speed issues of the entire encryption modules.All these strategies can  maj( , ,1) .
Creation of a fixed cell can be done within manufactured process and constant signals do not OUNTERMEASURES A power consumption (e.g. the side channel) of a module depends on many parameters.Only one of them is the private key.However, the channel output depends on the private key is often sufficient to reveal it.In order to oit this dependency between the side-channel output and the private key, an attacker usually builds a model of the side channel.This model is typically not very complex.In fact, attacks conducted in practice have shown that very simple models are ufficient to reveal the private key. Figure 3 channel attack [2].On the left side, the figure shows the physical device channel output is determined by the private key, the input and the f the device and by many other parameters.Some of them are known by the attacker, while others are not.The model of the side channel used by the attacker is shown on the right side in Fig. 3.The model may consider additional parameters the input and the output of the module.However there is always a certain Several countermeasures to power and EM attacks have been proposed so far; however, each technique may lead to design complexity, more power consumption, size and speed issues of the modules.All these strategies can be categorized in two groups: namely, they either try to randomize the intermediate result or take advantage of circuits with data and power consumption independency.These techniques can be implemented in architecture, logic, and algorithm or protocol level.The QCA circuits work takes advantage of QCA technology with low power consumption and data independency together with complicated clocking scheme that makes it difficult to make power consumption models for encryption engineering implemented in Q  groups: namely, they either try to randomize the intermediate result or take advantage of circuits with data and power consumption independency.These techniques can be implemented in architecture, logic, and algorithm or protocol level.The QCA circuits we introduce in this work takes advantage of QCA technology with low power consumption and data independency together with complicated clocking scheme that makes it very difficult to make power consumption models for encryption engineering implemented in QCA logic.energetic attacks EQUENTIAL QCA CIRCUITS Although we can always get similar functionality of sequential logic from a QCA wire segment spread across several clocking zones, i.e. a basic wire slave-type data storage, based on neighboring clocking zones acting as flipflop stages, to make a more secure logic style we added an additional logic signal "clock".To describe the consequent sequential logic we introduce a QCA in this part.The structure of a type latch [4] has been shown in Fig. 4.

Structure of a D-latch
The large area of the circuit and the limitation in the length of QCA wires are main issues when implementing and fabricating circuits in QCA technology.By taking advantage of a level to edge converter, it is possible to improve the D-type QCA flop.The level to edge converter exploits the intrinsic stages of clocking and zones in QCA.The converter consists of an AND gate and an inverter.The original signal is multiplicated with its inverted The simulation results obtained with QCA Designer [3] verifies the functionality of the proposed D-type nanoflip-flop (Fig. 5b).
Register is a cascade of flip-flops integrating the same controlling circuits that is used for dat receiving, processing and transmitting of information.
Serial register is used often to transform parallel type code to serial and on the contrary.Using serial code in cryptography is caused by need to transmit big amounts of binary informati limited number of connecting lines.The big quantity of connective conductors is necessary for the parallel transfer of digits.Transmitting encrypti serial way, bit by bit, on the one conductor, allows reducing sizes of connecting lines.
The circuit of a serial (shift) register, that is built on D-type flip-flops, allows performing the transformation serial type encryption show of Fig. 6.   maj maj( , , 1), maj( , , 1),1 , where C and D are pulse synchronization codes and encryption information.The simulation results obtained with QCA Designer [3] verifies the functionality of the flop (Fig. 5b).flops integrating the same controlling circuits that is used for data receiving, processing and transmitting of encryption Serial register is used often to transform parallel type code to serial and on the contrary.Using serial code in cryptography is caused by need to transmit big amounts of binary information through the limited number of connecting lines.The big quantity of connective conductors is necessary for the parallel cryption codes in a serial way, bit by bit, on the one conductor, allows The circuit of a serial (shift) register, that is built flops, allows performing the encryption code to parallel flop register

V. RESULTS AND D
Logic Boolean and majority equations of serial nanoregister with the right shift state on D flop are as follow: and so on.
The states of all outputs for shift register show in Table I.
Nanocircuit of this register is showed on Fig. 7, and is designed on a tablet field QCA Designer, as well as results of modeling of corresponding time response waveforms.
The states of all outputs for shift register show in of this register is showed on Fig. 7, and is designed on a tablet field QCA Designer, as well as results of modeling of corresponding time Positive pulses of logic "1" are corresponded by 1, and negative pulses of by negative polarizations -Р = 0 The simulated layout is based in QCA cell sized (20х20) nm, with 4 quantum dots each having a diameter of 5 nm, and the distance between the center of cells being 20 nm.The dimensions of the For a reduced area on the crystal, another D flip-flop format is proposed, the nanocircuit of which is shown in Fig. 8a.In Figure 8b shows the waveforms of operation, which completely coincide with the diagrams of the previous, complicated D-type flip-flop circuit in Fig. 5.
The states of all outputs for shift register show in Table II.
Nanocircuit of this register is showed on Fig. 8, and is designed on a tablet field QCADesigner, as well as results of modeling of corresponding time response waveforms.Positive pulses of logic "1" are corresponded by positive polarizations + negative pulses of logic "0" polarizations -Р = 0 respectively.

Automated Simulation Encryption Nanodevices
The simulated layout is based in QCA cell sized nm, with 4 quantum dots each having a nm, and the distance between the center of cells being 20 nm.The dimensions of the full multiplier design are (500 number of cells in 466.The energie consumption of on clock period form from For a reduced area on the crystal, another D-type flop format is proposed, the nanocircuit of which is shown in Fig. 8a.In Figure 8b shows the waveforms of operation, which completely coincide with the diagrams of the previous, complicated The states of all outputs for shift register show in of this register is showed on Fig. 8, and is designed on a tablet field QCADesigner, as well as results of modeling of corresponding time eforms.Positive pulses of logic "1" are corresponded by positive polarizations + Р = 1, and negative pulses of logic "0" -by negative In Figure 9а and on the QCAD simulation tablet, a circuit of an encryption nanoregister is built, which occupies a 27% smaller area on a 410 crystal, and the number of reduced from 466 to 318.The results of automated simulation of time diagrams ( coincide.and on the QCAD simulation tablet, a circuit of an encryption nanoregister is built, which occupies a 27% smaller area on a 410х1170 nm crystal, and the number of quantum automata is 66 to 318.The results of automated simulation of time diagrams (Fig. 7b), obviously,

Fig. 1 .
Fig. 1.A cell of a quantum automat placement in space (b) and

Fig. 2 .
Fig. 2. Majority gate (a) and inverter (b) in QCA Fig depicts the principles of a side-channel attack [2].On the left side, the figure shows the physical device that is attacked.Its side-channel output is determined by the private key, the input and the output of the device and by many other parameters.Some of them are known by the attacker, while others are not.The model of the side channel used by the attacker is shown on the right side in Fig.The model may consider additional parameters besides the key, the input and the output of the module.However there is always a certain imperfectness of the model.
basic logic gates in QCA are the majority gate (a) b) Majority gate (a) and inverter (b) in QCAThe output cell will polarized to the majority of polarization of input cells.The Boolean expression for majority function with inputs x 2 , x 1 and x 0 By fixing the polarization of any one input of the or logic 1, we obtain AND

Fig. 3 .
Fig. 3. Principles of energetic IV.ENCRYPTION SEQUENTIAL Although we can always get similar functionality of sequential logic from a QCA wire segment spread across several clocking zones, i.e. a basic wire implements the master-slave based on neighboring clocking zones acting as flip flop stages, to make a more secure logic style we added an additional logic signal "clock".To describe the consequent sequential logic we introduce a QCA D-Type flip-flop in this part.The structure of a D-type latch [4] has been shown in Fig. 4

Fig. 4 .
Fig. 4. Structure of a DThe large area of the circuit and the limitation in the length of QCA wires are main issues when implementing and fabricating circuits in technology.By taking advantage of a level to edge converter, it is possible to improve the D flip-flop.The level to edge converter exploits the intrinsic stages of clocking and zones in QCA.The converter consists of an AND gate and an inve The original signal is multiplicated with its inverted

Fig. 6 .
Fig. 6.Serial D-type flip-flop register 1990-5548 Electronics and Control Systems 2023.N delayed copy.The result is generation of short pulses at the rising edge of the original signal.The flop implemented with this a.Logic equation type flip-flop for t t Q CD CQ   type flip-flop (a) and simulation of waveforms (b) majority equations of serial nanoregister with the right shift state on D-type flip-

Fig. 7 .
Fig. 7. Shift register on 4 D register on 4 D-type flip-flops (a) and QCADesigner simulation results (b) 500x1760) nm and total number of cells in 466.The energie consumption of on clock period form from 23 3.8x10 J  to flops (a) and QCADesigner simulation results (b)

ISSN 1990- 5548
Electronics and Control Systems 2023.N b) -type nanoflip-flop (a) and simulation of waveforms (b a) b) Shift nanoregister on 4 D-type flip-flops (a) and QCADesigner simulation results (b) Energetic attacks seriously threaten encryption modules as they can be implemented with relatively equipment's.In this work, a new approach to implementation of quantum encryption modules via QCA technology has been presented.Majority logic style was introduced through design flop additional 'clock' signal as nology advances in developing novel countermeasures and designing more secure